3. The conscience may be said to be bound, 1. Subjectively, as the _subjectum quod_, or the faculty obliged. 2. Or objectively, as _conscire_, the act of conscience, is the thing _ad quod_, to which we are obliged. And upon those necessary distinctions I thus answer to the first question. _Prop._ 1. The act or the habit of conscience is not capable of being the subject obliged; no more than any other act or duty: the act or duty is not bound, but the man to the act or duty. 2. The faculty or judgment is not capable of being the object, or _materia ad quam_, the thing to which we are bound. A man is not bound to be a man, or to have an intellect, but is made such. 3. The faculty of conscience (that is, the intellect) is not capable of being the immediate or nearest _subjectum quod_, or subject obliged. The reason is, Because the intellect of itself is not a free-working faculty, but acteth necessarily per _modum naturæ_ further than it is under the empire of the will; and therefore intellectual and moral habits are by all men distinguished. 4. All legal or moral obligation falleth directly upon the will only: and so upon the person as a voluntary agent; so that it is proper to say, The will is bound, and The person is bound. 5. Improperly and remotely it may be said, The intellect (or faculty of conscience) is bound, or the tongue, or hand, or foot is bound; as the man is bound to use them. 6. Though it be not proper to say, That the conscience is bound, it is proper to say, That the man is bound to the act and habit of conscience, or to the exercise of the faculty. 7. The common meaning of the phrase, that we are bound in conscience, or that conscience is bound, is that we are bound to a thing by God, or by a divine obligation, and that it is a sin against God to violate it; so that divines use here to take the word conscience in the narrower theological sense, as respect to God's law and judgment doth enter the definition of it. 8. Taking conscience in this narrower sense, to ask, Whether man's law as man's do bind us in conscience, is all one as to ask, Whether man be God.[112] 9. And taking conscience in the large or general sense, to ask, Whether man's laws bind us in conscience subjectively, is to ask, Whether they bind the understanding to know our duty to man? And the tenor of them will show that, while they bind us to an outward act, or from an outward act, it is the man that they bind to or from that act, and that is, as he is a rational, voluntary agent; so that a human obligation is laid upon the man, on the will, and on the intellect, by human laws.