A Class Room Logic: Deductive and Inductive, with Special Application to the Science and Art of TeachingMcNair, George Hastings
Philosophy
A Class Room Logic: Deductive and Inductive, with Special Application to the Science and Art of Teaching
McNair, George Hastings
Logic
Any hypothesis should be made to conform to the following
requisites: (1) _The hypothesis must be conceivable._ The hypothetic
generalizations of primeval days were mere fancy. For example, the
loud noise from the clouds on dark days was the angry voice of the
God of the skies. Even in this day when a complex situation cannot
be explained there comes the temptation to draw entirely upon the
imagination, and advance an hypothesis which is absurd in every sense
of the word. The permissible hypothesis demands that there be some
ground for the conjecture. A fact or two at least must be used as the
foundation for whatever the constructive imagination may build. On
the other hand the past has taught us that we cannot afford to be too
exacting in the enforcement of this rule. The ideas of Copernicus,
Newton, Harvey, Darwin, and many another of the world’s best thinkers,
were looked upon at first as being ridiculous. There is always a bare
possibility of a “lurking truth” in the conjecture, _and no broad
minded and sanely educated man can afford to scoff blindly at something
which may seem to him mere fancy_. Prejudice and a willful blindness to
truth, have ever been imminent stumbling blocks in the path of progress.
(2) _The hypothesis must be capable of proof or disproof._ This
means, that where it is possible the hypothesis should touch, in one
form or another, our experience. If the hypothesis is wholly unlike
any experience we may have had, it becomes _impossible_ to ascertain,
whether it agrees or disagrees with the facts, which it is supposed
to explain. A legitimate hypothesis must furnish some opportunity
for securing facts to prove or disprove it. For example, to advance
an hypothesis relative to the conditions of the next world is hardly
permissible, as “spirit-facts” are entirely without our field of
experience. Surely, one returning from Heaven could give us no
conception of it; because there is nothing in the carnal mind that
may be used to interpret the experiences that must function in the
Celestial City.
(3) _The hypothesis must be adequate._ It should take into
consideration all the known facts. It stands to reason that, if _one_
known fact is ignored, the entire procedure is thus vitiated. It would
be absurd to suppose the moon to be inhabited without giving heed to
the fact of its having no atmosphere.
(4) _The hypothesis must be as simple as possible._ We must, of
course, recognize situations which in themselves are too complex to
admit of simple conjectures. The purport of the fourth rule is, that
the hypothesis should not be made _unnecessarily_ complex.
(5) _The hypothesis should not contradict any verified truth._ Any
conjecture which opposed the law of gravitation would be out of place.
Of course it is possible to have only apparent conflicts between the
new hypothesis and the old law. Further observation should show that
no such clash exists.
=10. THE USES OF HYPOTHESES.=
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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