The great object in the event of war is to stop the enemy at the coast. If this is done our cities and whole interior will be secure. For the accomplishment of this object our fortifications must be principally relied on. By placing strong works near the mouths of our great inlets in such positions as to command the entrances into them, as may be done in many instances, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for ships to pass them, especially if other precautions, and particularly that of steam batteries, are resorted to in their aid. In the wars between other powers into which we may be drawn in support of our neutral rights it can not be doubted that this defense would be adequate to the purpose intended by it, nor can it be doubted that the knowledge that such works existed would form a strong motive with any power not to invade our rights, and thereby contribute essentially to prevent war. There are, it is admitted, some entrances into our interior which are of such vast extent that it would be utterly impossible for any works, however extensive or well posted, to command them. Of this class the Chesapeake Bay, which is an arm of the sea, may be given as an example. But, in my judgment, even this bay may be defended against any power with whom we may be involved in war as a third party in the defense of our neutral rights. By erecting strong works at the mouth of James River, on both sides, near the capes, as we are now doing, and at Old Point Comfort and the Rip Raps, and connecting those works together by chains whenever the enemy's force appeared, placing in the rear some large ships and steam batteries, the passage up the river would be rendered impracticable. This guard would also tend to protect the whole country bordering on the bay and rivers emptying into it, as the hazard would be too great for the enemy, however strong his naval force, to ascend the bay and leave such a naval force behind; since, in the event of a storm, whereby his vessels might be separated, or of a calm, the ships and steam batteries behind the works might rush forth and destroy them. It could only be in the event of an invasion by a great power or a combination of several powers, and by land as well as by naval forces, that those works could be carried; and even then they could not fail to retard the movement of the enemy into the country and to give time for the collection of our regular troops, militia, and volunteers to that point, and thereby contribute essentially to his ultimate defeat and expulsion from our territory. Under a strong impression that a peace establishment of our Navy is connected with the possible event of war, and that the naval force intended for either state, however small it may be, is connected with the general system of public defense, I have thought it proper in communicating this report to submit these remarks on the whole subject. JAMES MONROE. WASHINGTON, _February 2, 1824_.