3. A third objection remains to be urged, which would be sufficient in itself to induce me to return the bill to the House with my objections. By uniting two subjects so incongruous as tariff and distribution it inevitably makes the fate of the one dependent upon that of the other in future contests of party. Can anything be more fatal to the merchant or manufacturer than such an alliance? What they most of all require is a system of moderate duties so arranged as to withdraw the tariff question, as far as possible, completely from the arena of political contention. Their chief want is permanency and stability. Such an increase of the tariff I believe to be necessary in order to meet the economical expenditures of Government. Such an increase, made in the spirit of moderation and judicious discrimination, would, I have no doubt, be entirely satisfactory to the great majority of the American people. In the way of accomplishing a measure so salutary and so imperatively demanded by every public interest, the legislative department will meet with a cordial cooperation on the part of the Executive. This is all that the manufacturer can desire, and it would be a burden readily borne by the people. But I can not too earnestly repeat that in order to be beneficial it must be permanent, and in order to be permanent it must command general acquiescence. But can such permanency be justly hoped for if the tariff question be coupled with that of distribution, as to which a serious conflict of opinion exists among the States and the people, and which enlists in its support a bare majority, if, indeed, there be a majority, of the two Houses of Congress? What permanency or stability can attach to a measure which, warring upon itself, gives away a fruitful source of revenue at the moment it proposes a large increase of taxes on the people? Is the manufacturer prepared to stake himself and his interests upon such an issue?