The Supreme Court of the United States has recently declared that a court-martial such as this was is the organism provided by law and clothed with the duty of administering justice in this class of cases. Its judgments, when approved, rest on the same basis and are surrounded by the same considerations which give conclusiveness to the judgments of other legal tribunals, including as well the lowest as the highest. It follows, accordingly, that when a lawfully constituted court-martial has duly declared its findings and its sentence and the same have been duly approved neither the President nor the Congress has any power to set them aside. The existence of such power is not openly asserted, nor perhaps is it necessarily implied, in the provisions of the bill which is before me, but when its enacting clauses are read in the light of the recitations of its preamble it will be seen that it seeks in effect the practical annulment of the findings and the sentence of a competent court-martial. A conclusion at variance with these findings has been reached after investigation by a board consisting of three officers of the Army. This board was not created in pursuance of any statutory authority and was powerless to compel the attendance of witnesses or to pronounce a judgment which could have been lawfully enforced. The officers who constituted it, in their report to the Secretary of War, dated March 19, 1879, state that in their opinion-- Justice requires * * * such action as may be necessary to annul and set aside the findings and sentence of the court-martial in the case of Major-General Fitz John Porter and to restore him to the positions of which that sentence deprived him, such restoration to take effect from the date of his dismissal from the service. The provisions of the bill now under consideration are avowedly based on the assumption that the findings of the court-martial have been discovered to be erroneous; but it will be borne in mind that the investigation which is claimed to have resulted in this discovery was made many years after the events to which that evidence related and under circumstances that made it impossible to reproduce the evidence on which they were based. It seems to me that the proposed legislation would establish a dangerous precedent, calculated to imperil in no small measure the binding force and effect of the judgments of the various tribunals established under our Constitution and laws.