A critical history of Greek philosophyStace, W. T. (Walter Terence)
Philosophy
A critical history of Greek philosophy
Stace, W. T. (Walter Terence)
Philosophy, Ancient
We can see at once how much wider this conception of causation is than
the modern conception. If we take Mill's definition of a cause as the
best expression of modern scientific ideas, we find that he defines a
cause as the "invariable and unconditional antecedent of a
phenomenon." This cuts out final causes at once. For {270} the final
cause is the end, and is not an antecedent in time. It also does not
include formal causes. For we do not now think of the concept of a
thing as being part of its cause. This leaves us with only material
and efficient causes, and these correspond roughly to the modern
notions of matter and energy. Even the efficient causes of Aristotle,
however, appear on further consideration, to be excluded from the
modern idea of causation. For, though the efficient cause is the
energy which produces motion, modern science regards it as purely
mechanical energy, whereas Aristotle thinks of it, as we shall see, as
an ideal force, operating not from the beginning but from the end. But
it must not be supposed that, in saying that the modern idea of
causation excludes formal and final causes, we mean that Aristotle is
wrong in adding them, or that the modern idea is better than
Aristotle's. It is not a question of better and worse at all. Modern
science does not in any way deny the reality of formal and final
causes. It merely considers them to be outside its sphere. It is no
business of science whether they exist or not. As knowledge advances,
differentiation and division of labour occur. Science takes as its
province mechanical causes, and leaves formal and final causes to the
philosopher to explicate. Thus, for example, formal causes are not
considered by science because they are not, in the modern sense,
causes at all. They are what we have called reasons. If we are to
explain the existence of an object in the universe it may be necessary
to introduce formal causes, concepts, to show why the thing exists, to
show in fact its reasons. But science makes no attempt to explain the
existence of objects. It takes their {271} existence for granted, and
seeks to trace their history and their relations to each other.
Therefore it does not require formal causes. It seeks to work out the
mechanical view of the universe, and therefore considers only
mechanical causes. But Aristotle's theory, as being philosophy rather
than science, includes both the principles of mechanism and teleology.
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