A critical history of Greek philosophyStace, W. T. (Walter Terence)
Philosophy
A critical history of Greek philosophy
Stace, W. T. (Walter Terence)
Philosophy, Ancient
Another mistake which we must avoid is to suppose that the design in
nature means that nature is conscious of her designs, or, on the other
hand, that there is any {290} existent consciousness outside the world
which governs and controls it. The latter supposition is excluded by
the fact that God is not an existent conscious person, the former by
its own inherent absurdity. The only being upon this earth who is
conscious of his ends is man. Such animals as bees and ants appear to
work rationally, and their activities are clearly governed by design.
But it is not to be supposed that they are reasoning beings. They
attain their ends instinctively. And when we come to inorganic matter,
we find that even here its movements are purposive, but no one could
suppose them deliberate and conscious. These manifold activities of
lower nature are indeed the work of reason, but not of an existent or
self-conscious reason. And this means that instinct, and even
mechanical forces such as gravitation are, in their essence, reason.
It is not that they are created by reason, but that they are reason,
exhibiting itself in lower forms. In commenting upon Plato's dualism
of sense and reason, I remarked that any true philosophy, though
recognizing the distinction between sense and reason, must yet find
room for their identity, and must show that sense is but a lower form
of reason. This idea Aristotle thoroughly understood, and sought to
show, not merely that sense is reason, but even that the activities of
inorganic matter, such as gravitation, are so. In the result, nature,
though working through reason, is not conscious of the fact, does so
blindly and instinctively, and is compared to a creative artist, who
forms beautiful objects by instinct, or, as we should say, by
inspiration, without setting before his mind the end to be attained or
the rules to be observed in order to attain it.
{291}
In the process of nature, it is always form which impels, matter which
retards and obstructs. The entire world-movement is the effort of form
to mould matter, but, just because matter has in itself a power of
resistance, this effort does not always succeed. This is the reason
why form cannot exist without matter, because it can never wholly
overcome the clogging activity of matter, and therefore matter can
never be wholly moulded into form. And this explains, too, the
occasional occurrence in nature of freaks, monstrosities, abortions,
and unnatural births. In these the form has failed to mould the
matter. Nature has failed to attain her ends. Science, therefore,
should study the normal and natural rather than the abnormal and
monstrous. For it is in the normal that the ends of nature are to be
seen, and through them alone nature can be understood. Aristotle is
fond of using the words "natural" and "unnatural," but he uses them
always with this special meaning. That is natural which attains its
end, that in which the form successfully masters the matter.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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