A critical history of Greek philosophyStace, W. T. (Walter Terence)
Philosophy
A critical history of Greek philosophy
Stace, W. T. (Walter Terence)
Philosophy, Ancient
Aristotle's solution of this problem follows from the general
principles of his philosophy. We have seen that, throughout nature,
every being has its proper end, and the attainment of this end is its
special function. Hence the good for each being must be the adequate
performance of its special function. The good for man will not consist
in the pleasure of the senses. Sensation is the special function of
animals, but not of man. Man's special function is reason. Hence the
proper {316} activity of reason is the _summum bonum_, the good for
man. Morality consists in the life of reason. But what precisely that
means we have still to see.
Man is not only a reasoning animal. As the higher being, he contains
within himself the faculties of the lower beings also. Like plants he
is appetitive, like animals, sensitive. The passions and appetites are
an organic part of his nature. Hence virtue will be of two kinds. The
highest virtues will be found in the life of reason, and the life of
thought, philosophy. These intellectual virtues are called by
Aristotle dianoetic. Secondly, the ethical virtues proper will consist
in the submission of the passions and appetites to the control of
reason. The dianoetic virtues are the higher, because in them man's
special function alone is in operation, and also because the thinking
man most resembles God, whose life is a life of pure thought.
Happiness, therefore, consists in the combination of dianoetic and
ethical virtues. They alone are of absolute value to man. Yet, though
he places happiness in virtue, Aristotle, in his broad and practical
way, does not overlook the fact that external goods and circumstances
have a profound influence upon happiness, and cannot be ignored, as
the Cynics attempted to ignore them. Not that Aristotle regards
externals as having any value in themselves. What alone is good in
itself, is an end in itself, is virtue. But external goods help a man
in his quest of virtue. Poverty, sickness, and misfortune, on the
other hand, hinder his efforts. Therefore, though externals are not
goods in themselves, they may be a means towards the good. Hence they
are not to be despised and rejected. Riches, friends, health, {317}
good fortune, are not happiness. But they are negative conditions of
it. With them happiness is within our grasp. Without them its
attainment is difficult. They will be valued accordingly.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account