It is now pretty well known to Western readers that, though in the administrative authorities the Shogunate appeared potent, in the question of the legitimacy of the title, that is to say, the sovereignty, the Imperial court was viewed as the only lawful head by the Japanese in general, nay, it was so in the point of fact. But in those days, foreigners used to say and to think that the emperor was only the spiritual head and the Shogun was the temporal chief of Japan, and they were unable to see what turning movements were approaching, the result of which would be the restoration of the Imperial authority and the consolidation of the country under one single head in the person of the emperor, as the sovereign _de facto_ as well as _de jure_. It was only natural for onlookers to fail to penetrate such matters, and Léon Roches, sagacious as he was, was unable to differ from others. With Harry Parkes the case was different. He had grown up in the Far East: he was well acquainted with the Chinese ideographs; he understood Oriental thought contained in books and documents, written with those ideographs. Besides, several of his countrymen already in Japan had kept keen observation of the true situation and had intercourse with several Imperialist patriots, and their counsel could not fail to be valuable to Sir Harry. He was soon able to realise the relative positions occupied in the organic composition of Japan by the Imperial court and the Shogunate respectively. Thus the English policy, that is Parkes, came to differ from that of France, that is Léon Roches. Roches's sympathy continued to be on the side of the Shogunate, even after the latter had suffered defeats, which may be shown by the fact that when Admiral Enomoto left the Bay of Yedo with his fleets after the submission of the Shogun and went to Hakodate, several French military instructors went with him. It is true they left the troops of Enomoto before the latter was brought to submission, but they would not have gone with him at all if the French representative had ceased to sympathise with the Shogunate's cause. Roches's influence had been gradually eclipsed by that of Parkes. It is imaginable, however, that should the advisers of the Shogunate have accepted Roches's offer as to money and forces, the course of the history of Japan might have presented some difference, although the ultimate end would have been just the same. Nevertheless, thanks to the loyalty and patriotism, before which there is no difference of sentiment and opinion amongst the Japanese, no countenance had been given to the policy of Roches by the Shogunate, which preferred its own downfall rather than an acceptance of foreign assistance.