A Few Words About the Devil, and Other Biographical Sketches and EssaysBradlaugh, Charles
Religion
A Few Words About the Devil, and Other Biographical Sketches and Essays
Bradlaugh, Charles
Free thought
Propositions.--Existence is prior to its modes. This follows from
definitions 1 and 3, because modes of existence are conceived relatively
and in dependence on existence, which is absolutely precedent in such
conception. Existences having different attributes have nothing in
common with each other. This is founded on definition 1. Existences have
nothing in common with each other, can not be the cause of, or affect
one another. If they have nothing in common, they can not be conceived
by means of each other (per axiom 5), and they can not be conceived as
relating to each other, but must be conceived _per se_ (per definition
1); and as (per axiom 4) the knowledge of an effect depends on the
knowledge of the cause and includes it, it is impossible to conceive any
existence as an effect, so long as you can not conceive it in relation
to any other existence. By "cause" in the absolute, I mean "existence."
In its popular or relative sense, I use "cause" as an effect of some
precedent causative influence, itself the cause of some consequent
effect, as the means toward an end, in the accomplishment of which end
it completes itself.
What fact is there so certain that I may base all my reasonings upon it?
My existence is this primary fact; this, to me, indubitable certainty. I
am. This logic can neither prove nor disprove. The very nature of proof
is to make a proposition more clear to the mind than it was before, and
no amount of evidence can in-crease my conviction of the certainty of my
own existence. I do not affirm that I am in existence, but I affirm that
there is existence. This existence is either eternal, that is, unlimited
in duration, that is, indefinite in duration; or else it had a
beginning, that is, it has been created. If created, then such creation
must be by some existence the same as itself, or by some existence
differing from itself. But it can not have been created by any existence
the same as itself, because to imagine such, would be to conceive
no more than a continuance of the same existence--there would be
no discontinuity. "But," says S. T. Coleridge, "where there is no
discontinuity, there can be no origination." And it can not have been
created by any existence differing from itself, because things which
have nothing in common with one another can not be the cause of, or
affect, one another. Therefore, this existence has not been created,
that is, its duration is indefinite--that is, you can not conceive a
beginning--that is, it is eternal. This eternal existence is either
infinite in extent, that is, is unlimited in extent, or it is finite,
that is, limited. If limited, it must be limited by an existence the
same as itself, or by an existence differing from itself. But the same
arguments which applied to a limitation of duration, also apply to
a limitation of extension. Therefore, this existence is unlimited in
extent; that is, is infinite and eternal--that is, there is only one
existence.
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