A General View of Positivism: Or, Summary exposition of the System of Thought and LifeComte, Auguste
Philosophy
A General View of Positivism: Or, Summary exposition of the System of Thought and Life
Comte, Auguste
Positivism
The first condition, that of laying down fixed principles, is, in fact,
the extension to social questions of that separation between theory
and practice, which in subjects of less importance is universally
recognized. This is the aspect in which the superiority of the new
spiritual system to the old is most perceptible. The principles of
moral and political conduct that were accepted in the Middle Ages
were little better than empirical, and owed their stability entirely
to the sanction of religion. In this respect, indeed, the superiority
of Catholicism to the systems which preceded it, consisted merely in
the fact of separating its precepts from the special application of
them. By making its precepts the distinct object of preliminary study,
it secured them against the bias of human passions. Yet important as
this separation was, the system was so defective intellectually, that
the successful application of its principles depended simply on the
good sense of the teachers; for the principles in themselves were as
vague and as absolute as the creeds from which they were derived. The
influence exercised by Catholicism was due to its indirect action upon
social feeling in the only mode then possible. But the claims with
which Positivism presents itself are far more satisfactory. It is based
on a complete synthesis; one which embraces, not the outer world only,
but the inner world of human nature. This, while in no way detracting
from the practical value of social principles, give them the imposing
weight of theoretical truth; and ensures their stability and coherence,
by connecting them with the whole series of laws on which the life of
man and of society depend. For these laws will corroborate even those
which are not immediately deduced from them. By connecting all our
rules of action with the fundamental conception of social duty, we
render their interpretation in each special case clear and consistent,
and we secure it against the sophisms of passion. Principles such as
these, based on reason, and rendering our conduct independent of the
impulses of the moment, are the only means of sustaining the vigour
of Social Feeling, and at the same time of saving us from the errors
to which its unguided suggestions so often lead. Direct and constant
culture of Social Feeling in public as well as in private life is no
doubt the first condition of morality. But the natural strength of
Self-love is such that something besides this is required to control
it. The course of conduct must be traced beforehand in all important
cases by the aid of demonstrable principles, adopted at first upon
trust, and afterwards from conviction.
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