The first four of these characteristics call for no comment. By the fecundity of a pleasure Bentham understands its likelihood of being followed by other pleasures; by its purity, the likelihood that it will not be followed by pains. The characteristic "extent" marks off utilitarianism from egoism, for it has reference to the number of persons affected by the pleasure or the pain. The greater the number, the higher the value in question. The greatest number of pleasures of the highest value, as free as possible from admixture with pains, is the goal of the endeavors of the utilitarian. Naturally, when the interests of many persons are taken into account, the question of the principle according to which "lots" of pleasure are to be distributed becomes a pressing one. Bentham decides it as follows: "Everybody to count for one, and nobody for more than one." [Footnote: See the discussion of Bentham's dictum in its bearings on justice, J. S. Mill, _Utilitarianism_, chapter v.] In other words, the distribution should be an impartial one. At first sight, this account of the relative desirability of pleasures and undesirability of pains seems sensible enough. Men do desire pleasure, and they undoubtedly approve the preference given to pleasures more intense, enduring, certain, immediate, fruitful in further pleasures, free from painful consequences, and shared by many, over those which have not these characteristics: "_Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure_-- Such marks in _pleasures_ and in _pains_ endure. Such pleasures seek, if _private_ be thy end: If it be _public_, wide let them _extend_. Such _pains_ avoid, whichever be thy view; If pains _must_ come, let them _extend_ to few." [Footnote: _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, chapter iv, i, Note.] These mnemonic lines may well strike many readers as embodying a very good working rule of common-sense morality; as paying a proper regard to prudence and to benevolence as well. But there are passages in Bentham calculated to shake such acquiescence. He writes: "Now pleasure is in _itself_ a good; nay, even setting aside immunity from pain, the only good: pain is in itself an evil, and, indeed without exception, the only evil; or else the words good and evil have no meaning. And this is alike true of every sort of pain, and of every sort of pleasure." [Footnote: _Ibid_., chapter x, 10.] "Let a man's motive be ill-will; call it even malice, envy, cruelty; it is still a kind of pleasure that is his motive: the pleasure he takes at the thought of the pain which he sees, or expects to see, his adversary undergo. Now even this wretched pleasure, taken by itself, is good: it may be faint; it may be short; it must at any rate be impure: yet, while it lasts, and before any bad consequences arrive, it is as good as any other that is not more intense." [Footnote: _Ibid_, note.] Reflection upon such passages may well lead a man to ask himself: