A Handbook of Ethical TheoryFullerton, George Stuart
Philosophy
A Handbook of Ethical Theory
Fullerton, George Stuart
Ethics
Thus, the egoist may ignore duties to others, but he cannot free himself
from the problems of the distribution of happiness in his own life and of
the calculus of pleasures. The intuitionist, who, among other precepts,
accepts as ultimate those enjoining upon him justice and benevolence, may
well ask himself toward whom these virtues are to be exercised, and
whether the claims of all who belong to the class in question are
identical in kind and degree. If they are not, he must find some rule for
estimating their relative importance. He who makes it his moral ideal to
Follow Nature, to Strive for Perfection, or to Realize his Capacities,
must determine in detail what conduct, self-regarding and other-
regarding, the acceptance of such aims entails. Only the unreflective can
regard the utilitarian as having a monopoly of the difficulties which
face the moralist. The vague general statement that we should strive to
render others happy--a duty recognized by men of very different schools--
never frees us from the perplexities which arise when it is asked: What
others? With what degree of impartiality? When? By what means? But that
such questions can be approached by a path more satisfactory than that
followed by the utilitarian, there is good reason to maintain. [Footnote:
See, below, chapter xxx, Sec Sec 140-142.]
112. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS FOR UTILITARIANISM.--It is worth while to
summarize what may be said for utilitarianism, and what may be said
against it. It may be argued in its favor:
(1) That it appears to set as the aim of human endeavor, an intelligible
end, and a fairly definite one. Everyone has some notion of what
happiness means, and is not without ideas touching the way to seek his
own happiness, or to contribute to that of others.
(2) The end is one actually desired by men at all stages of intellectual
and moral development. Men are impelled to seek their own happiness, and
there are few who do not feel impelled to take into consideration, to
some degree, at least, the happiness of some others.
(3) The general happiness is not merely desired by some men, but it is
felt to be _desirable;_ that is, it is an end not out of harmony
with the moral judgments of mankind. It makes its appeal to the social
nature of man; it seems to furnish a basis for the exercise of
benevolence and justice.
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