Men of quite varying views have inclined to the doctrine which appeals to me. I think it is to be gotten out of Hegel. Green, who is much influenced by him, takes, as the rational end of conduct, a "satisfaction on the whole," which implies a harmonization and unification of the desires (see, in this book, Chapter XXVI, Sec 122). Spencer, in his _Study of Sociology_, defines the rational as the consistent. Stephen, in his _Science of Ethics_, chapter ii, Sec 3, says: "Reason, in short, whatever its nature, is the faculty which enables us to act with a view to the distant and the future." He claims that rationality tends to bring about a certain unity or harmony. Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_, (pp. 572-581), says that reason harmonizes the impulses. The champions of the opposite view are the intuitionists proper--such men as Kant, Reid, Price, even Sidgwick. To judge of their doctrine--they were great men, be it remembered, and worthy of all respect--I suggest that the reader wait until he has read the chapter on _Intuitionism_ in this volume, Chapter XXIII. 5. CHAPTERS XVII TO XIX.--What is said in Chapter XVII seems too obviously true to need comment. Indeed, it may be questioned whether the chapter is not full of platitudes. But even platitudes are overlooked by some; and there is some merit in arranging them systematically. Besides, they may serve as a spring-board. As to Chapter XVIII, I suggest reading chapter vii, of Westermarck's book on _The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_. It is entitled _Customs and Laws as Expressions of Moral Ideas_. For Chapter XIX, one may read Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_, Part I, chapter vi, where he shows how the mere "group morality" gradually gives place to a wider morality in which the concept of humanity plays a part. In the same work, Part II, chapters i and ii, the author treats of religious or sub-religious ideas as affecting conduct. Compare Westermarck, _op. cit._, chapter xl. See, also, _The Ancient City_, by Fustel de Coulanges. 6. CHAPTERS XX TO XXII.--What is said in Chapter XX may be well reinforced by turning to Hobhouse (_op. cit._), Part I, chapter iii, where he traces the gradual evolution of rational morality in the field of justice. See, also, Westermarck, (_op. cit._) chapters ix and x, i. e., "The Will as the Subject of Moral Judgment and the Influence of External Events," and "Agents under Intellectual Disability." In the last chapter referred to, animals, drunkards, idiots, the insane, etc., come on the stage. The chapter is full of curious information.