A Handbook of the Boer War: With General Map of South Africa and 18 Sketch Maps and Plans
History
A Handbook of the Boer War: With General Map of South Africa and 18 Sketch Maps and Plans
South African War, 1899-1902
Lord Roberts had sent Kitchener with a column to see to the trouble in
the Free State, and could not put more than about 16,000 men into the
field against Botha, who, with 6,000 men, had taken up a strong position
astride the Delagoa Bay railway sixteen miles east of Pretoria. His
centre was at Pienaar's Poort, where the railway passes through a
defile, and his front, which his former experience of Lord Roberts'
tactics led him to extend greatly, was nearly twenty-five miles in
length, and ran along an irregular chain of hills, kopjes, and ridges.
Facing the Diamond Hill and Donkerhoek range, south of the centre, is
another range of heights through which the two poorts Tyger and Zwavel
pass, and which circles round the source of Pienaar's River towards the
Diamond Hill range. North of the centre runs a broken range ending
abruptly at the Kameelfontein ridge, which overlooks the broad
Kameelfontein valley leading to the Krokodil Spruit; and across the
valley rises the Boekenhoutskloof ridge, a detached feature with
triangular contours, which, being somewhat in advance, commands the
approaches to Kameelfontein ridge, where the Boer right flank under
Delarey was posted.
The left flank was on Mors Kop and curved round indefinitely to
Kameelzyn Kraal with detached posts in the direction of Tygerpoort. The
centre north and south of Pienaar's Poort was the strongest section of
the line, and for this reason and for another it was held by
comparatively small numbers. Botha was an acute observer and had learnt
the moves of the British autumn manoeuvre opening, a holding attack on
the centre not intended to be pushed home in order to eke out paucity of
numbers operating on a wide front. Lord Roberts, in spite of his
superiority of strength, could not hope to inflict a decisive defeat
upon Botha's well-posted commandos, but only to remove them out of
striking distance of Pretoria, and he was successful.
The earlier movements of the attack on June 11 were in the nature of a
reconnaissance in force, as it was uncertain how far to the north and
south the Boer front extended. The usual tactics were adopted. French
with the 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades under Porter and Dickson was to
work round the enemy's right flank and to endeavour to circle round it
to the railway; a demonstrating attack on the centre would be made by
Pole-Carew; while Ian Hamilton acted against the left flank.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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