The battle of Bergendal on August 27 was mainly a struggle between less than fourscore Transvaal Police and two battalions and forty guns of Buller's Division. The "Zarps" held a rocky ridge at the end of a spur, where they were bombarded for three hours, yet when the infantry advanced it was met with a vigorous rifle fire, which was continued almost without intermission until at last the kopje was carried by assault. The defence of the kopje was one of the most conspicuous feats of the war on the Boer side, and it is noteworthy that it was made by a body of regularly disciplined men. Owing partly no doubt to the difficulty of reinforcing such an isolated position, no effective support was given by Botha to the gallant little band, neither did he trouble Buller seriously with artillery fire; and the commandos east and north of the Zarps' kopje did little. He does not seem to have recognized that Bergendal was not a mere strong post, but the key of an unsound position which should at all hazards have been safeguarded. This Buller saw at once, and he moved so as to meet with the least interference from the enemy, who, having two fronts, could not act solidly upon either of them. The capture of Bergendal dissolved the Boer position. The commandos facing Buller were driven off; and the right, which had been opposing French and Pole-Carew so feebly that neither of them suffered a single casualty, fell away. Buller went in pursuit, but was unable to worry the retreat. Some commandos withdrew eastwards along the line, others broke off towards Lydenburg and Barberton. The Boer Governments retired from Machadodorp to Nelspruit. Buller crossed the railway, and on August 29 Helvetia was taken. Next day the British prisoners of war, whom the Boers had brought away in the scuttle from Pretoria when Lord Roberts entered the city, were released at Noitgedacht by their captors, who were no longer in a position to detain them. Botha had indeed been forced into retreat, but not cut off, and he escaped with all his guns and his losses were comparatively slight. His burghers were, as usual after a lost battle, demoralized and disheartened for the time being, but not, as was thought by the British Army, scared by their reverses into abject impotence. From the time of the occupation of Bloemfontein _guerilla_ had been gradually taking the place of organized warfare, of which Bergendal was the last act, and which the burghers saw that they could not hope to wage successfully. The history of the previous seven months showed what could be won by _guerilla_, and what could be lost by pretending to be an Army. The fact that they were no longer able to act as a coherent military body did not permanently discourage them, and the struggle had not yet run more than one-third of its weary course.