6. It will not be denied, but when the case is so circumstantiate, that it would require the arbitration of judgment to determine, whether the king be a tyrant or not, that then people are not to disown him: for if it be a question, whether the people be really robbed of their rights and liberties, and that the king might pretend as much reason to complain of the people's doing indignity to his sovereignty, as they might of his tyranny; then it were hard for them to assume so far the umpirage of their own cause, as to make themselves absolute judges of it, and forthwith to reject his authority upon these debatable grounds. But the case is not so with us; no place being left for doubt or debate, but that our fundamental rights and liberties civil and religious, are overturned, and an absolute tyranny, exactly characterized as above, is established on the ruins thereof. Hence we have not disowned the pretended authority, because we judged it was tyrannical, but because it was really so. Our discretive judgment in the case was not our rule, but it was our understanding of the rule, by which only we could be regulated, and not by the understanding of another, which cannot be better, nor so good, of our grievances, which certainly we may be supposed to understand best ourselves, and yet they are such as are understood every where. To the question then, who shall be judge between these usurping and tyrannizing rulers and us? We answer briefly and plainly. We do not usurp a judgment in the case pretending no more authority over them in our private capacity, than we allow them to have over us, that is none at all? Nor can we admit that they should be both judges and party; for then they might challenge that prerogative in every case, and strengthen themselves in an uncontrollable immunity and impunity to do what they pleased. But we appeal to the fundamental laws of the kingdom, agreeable to the word of God, to judge, and to the whole world of impartial spectators to read and pronounce the judgment. Lex Rex, Quest. 24. pag. 213. saith in answer to this, 'There is a court of necessity no less than a court of justice; and the fundamental laws must then speak, and it is with the people in this extremity as if they had no ruler. And as to the doubtsomeness of these laws, he saith, (1.) As the scriptures in all fundamentals are clear, and expound themselves, and _in the first instance_ condemn heresies; so all laws of men in their fundamentals, which are the law of nature and nations, are clear. (2.) Tyranny is more visible and intelligible than heresy, and it is soon discerned----The people have a natural throne of policy in their conscience, to give warning, and materially sentence against the king as a tyrant;--where tyranny is more obscure, and the thread small, that it escape the eye of man, the king keepeth possession, but I deny that tyranny can be obscure long.'