[Sidenote: _Canada was conquered by Great Britain, not by the English colonies._] When the Seven Years' War came, the English colonists in North America outnumbered the French by thirteen to one; but, at the moment, superiority in numbers was largely counterbalanced by the want of union in the English colonies, whereas Canada was one. Therefore the issue largely depended on the forces and the leaders sent out by the two mother countries respectively. England, inspired by Pitt, sent out abundant troops. France, inspired by Madame de Pompadour, kept nearly all her troops to fight Frederick of Prussia, with his few English and Hanoverian allies. The result was the defeat of the French in North America, and the British conquest of Canada. Whatever might have been the result if the crisis had been postponed, it was not the British colonists but the troops from England, who, in 1758-60, decided the fate of North America. It is customary, in writing accounts of the colonial wars of Great Britain, to emphasize the merits of the colonial soldiers, who have the advantage of knowing the country and the mode of {339} fighting appropriate to it; and to depreciate the regulars sent from home. Reverses, like that of Braddock, are written and read from a colonial point of view; and in America, more especially, the colonists' side has been emphasized in consequence of the results of the subsequent War of Independence. But, as a matter of fact, excellent as were some of the colonial troops, such as Robert Rogers' Rangers, Canada was conquered by soldiers from England under able English generals like Wolfe and Amherst; and similarly the burden of the defence of Canada fell mainly on Montcalm and the few regiments which had been spared to him from France. [Sidenote: _The English command of the water._] As the French kept for war on the continent of Europe the troops which should have been sent to North America, so they allowed the English to gain control of the water, over which alone troops and supplies could be sent to New France. 'The possession of Canada,' writes Captain Mahan, 'depended upon sea power.'[6] After the victory of Hawke in Quiberon Bay, and other English successes on sea, Burke, in the _Annual Register_ for 1760,[7] wrote that France 'was obliged to sit, the impotent spectator of the ruin of her colonies, without being able to send them the slightest succour. It was then she found what it was to be inferior at sea.' Especially important was the command of the water to those who would hold Canada, for two reasons; because Canada, poor and undeveloped, was dependent on supplies from Europe, to a greater extent than the English colonies[8] in North America; and because she could and must be attacked by the St. Lawrence. [Footnote 6: _Influence of Sea Power upon History_ (6th ed.), p. 294.] [Footnote 7: p. 9.] [Footnote 8: Thus Charlevoix (as above, p. 38) says Canada 'has always had more from France than it could pay.']