Why does the Bank of France charge a discount? Is it, as Proudhon suggests, because it supplies cash in return for a bill of exchange, so that “the seigneurial right of discount”[676] would disappear with the adoption of a non-metallic currency? The bank charges discount simply because it gives a certain quantity of merchandise immediately exchangeable in return for a bill of exchange falling due some months hence. It gives a tangible commodity in exchange for a promise—a present good for a future. What the bank takes is the difference between the present value of the bill of exchange and its value when it falls due. It is not the mere whim of the banker or the employment of a particular kind of money that gives rise to discount. It belongs to the very nature of things. Proudhon notwithstanding, a sale for cash and a sale with future payment must remain two different operations,[677] at least as long as the actual possession of a good is judged to be more advantageous than its future possession. This difference, even in the case of the Exchange Bank, would very soon reappear. The exchange notes would represent goods which were to be sold at a certain date. Although the Bank may refuse to discount, this will not lessen the advantage enjoyed by those merchants who are paid in cash. In order to secure this advantage they will enter into agreement with those buyers who pay cash either in the form of goods or of precious metals (which are, after all, commodities), granting a slight rebate on the paper price. There would thus be two sets of prices, the paper prices of goods sold for future payment and the money price of goods sold for cash. The first would be higher than the second, and the difference—refused by the banks—would be pocketed by the sellers. Money interest would then reappear under a new form. To this Proudhon would reply that the clients of the bank, under the terms of their agreement, are debarred from taking any such premiums. Of course, if they remained faithful to their promises interest or discount would be suppressed; but this would result, not from the organisation of the Exchange Bank, but because of mutual agreement. This would be a purely moral reform requiring no banking contrivance to aid it, but one in which progress must inevitably be very slow. The Bank of Exchange failing to suppress discount, or to check the right of escheat in general, Proudhon’s other conclusions fall to the ground.