The confederates, who opposed in arms the reigning king and the Russian party, chiefly on the ground that they had insisted on the rights of the dissidents or dissenters in opposition to the orthodox Catholics, received constant though secret help from France. The conduct of Austria also was as yet ambiguous, and, judging by its natural interests, should have been opposed to that of Russia. On such hopes the confederates rested. Occasional success lured them on more rapidly to inevitable ruin. But France was too far away to give real help. Choiseul fell before the intrigues of the Dubarry party, and neither nation nor ministry was in a temper or position to pursue with energy a distant and unselfish policy. On the other hand, Austria speedily began to see more advantage in joining the prosperous and rising powers of Eastern Europe than in trying to prop up against them a falling cause. It became evident that Russia would soon be absolute master of the kingdom. Frederick of Prussia could not see such an accession to the power of his dangerous neighbour without taking some corresponding measures, and as a Prussian army entered and pillaged ruthlessly all the northern provinces, it became plain that there existed some understanding between Frederick and the Empress. The movement of Austrian troops, at first supposed to be friendly to the confederates, soon proved that Maria Theresa, however grandly she might write and speak, had joined in the conspiracy of robbers; and before the year 1772 was over the treaty made early in the year was declared; and the necessary concessions were wrung with much violence from the King and legislature, absolutely unable to assert any will of their own. The final ratification took place in May 1773. The kingdom was to be partitioned. Each of the three great neighbours was to receive a portion somewhat in proportion to its size. Russia got 87,500 square miles; Austria 62,500; Prussia only 9,465 square miles, but these containing the best and most industrious part of the nation. What remained was formed into an hereditary monarchy in the house of Stanislas. It is fair to say, as an excuse for the supineness with which England looked on at this vast national crime, that the best and wisest of her statesmen had systematically directed their attention to the depression of the house of Bourbon. In the system of balance of power, as then understood, nothing was regarded as so likely to prove a check on the power of that house as the increase of the influence of Russia. Any movement in favour of Poland must have been in union with France and in opposition to Russia, and would have tended at first to reverse that action, which was generally regarded as most consistent with the safety of English interests. In the face of recent facts (1871), it may be clearly evident that the dangers of Europe come from the East and not from the West; but it is not fair to blame statesmen or nations because