Another design was entertained, which is worth mentioning, although it was not carried into effect. A couple of thousand experienced troops, made up of cavalry and infantry, especially arquebusiers, were to be transferred [A.D. 1638.] from the Spanish to the English service; and the Spaniards were to be allowed in return to enlist a corresponding number in the British dominions. These were to be conveyed to Scotland in Flemish ships, but at the cost of the English, and to be stationed in Edinburgh Castle either by amicable means or by force. From this point they were to be put into communication with the royalists in the northern counties, especially with Huntly, and with the town of Aberdeen. The power of the King would have become so strong in Scotland itself, that, under the influence of coercive measures adopted simultaneously by sea and land, the Covenanters in the capital and in the southern counties might well have been expected to consent to such an agreement as the King desired[117]. The prospect of a very widely extended alliance between various elements of strength had thus been opened: but to secure their co-operation, which was naturally difficult to bring about, diplomatic negotiations of the most prolix character with the courts of Brussels and Madrid were also necessary. While the King was still engaged upon them the Scots on their side were already making preparations for resistance. But if success depended upon bringing over experienced troops from the Continent to Great Britain, this was far easier for the Scots than for the English. We have already mentioned in what numbers the Scots served under the Swedish flag in Germany[118]. If the Protestant cause which they defended in Germany were now to be fought for and carried through in their own native country, how could they hesitate to return thither? The heads of their families, for whom they still cherished an inborn attachment, now themselves summoned them home.