The French were convinced that Charles I wished for the continuance of the war between France and Spain in order that meanwhile he might revive his naval power, recover his lost reputation, and enrich his country; but that he was so fettered by the profitable relation which he secretly [A.D. 1638.] maintained with the Spaniards that he would never proceed boldly to fight for the interests of the Palatinate: that, if he now seemed inclined for an agreement with France, he was only trying to induce the house of Austria by arousing anxiety as to his alliance, to make some trivial concessions to his nephews with which he would be content. The obligation of keeping up a fleet on the coasts, which Charles undertook by the treaty, was considered by the French far too contemptible considering the greatness of the cause which the two powers upheld. Why then, we may ask, did the circumspect Cardinal Richelieu consent to this alliance? His anxieties were the reason for his conduct: he wished to keep King Charles from allying himself more closely with the house of Austria. He put off the definitive conclusion of the treaty until the conference at Hamburg, because he foresaw that it would encounter obstacles there and be delayed. In the summer of 1637 the articles had been laid down: in the autumn of 1637 Richelieu gave to Bellièvre, the President of the Parliament, who went as ambassador to England, instructions not indeed to conclude anything, for this was far from his intention, but only to keep Charles I in the belief that France wished for the conclusion of the treaty, and that she would promote it at Hamburg. Meanwhile he was to induce that sovereign to throw more obstacles in the way of intercourse between Spain and the Netherlands[127]. In February 1638 the Council of State, which worked under Richelieu’s directions, once more considered the treaty. Father Joseph, who sat in this council, proposed to insert the condition that the King of England should employ his ships not only for the protection of his own coasts, but for the attack of the coasts of the Spanish Netherlands, or of the Spanish peninsula[128]. The other members agreed, but went a step further still: they demanded that a joint attack should be made upon some place or other in the [A.D. 1638.] Netherlands, to be more precisely determined by and by: they thought that it was in the highest degree unjust that England should not support the French, and yet should wish to prevent them from conquering Dunkirk for instance. They thought, moreover, that any share in governing the conquered territory after the fashion of the Swiss bailiwicks could be allowed to England only if that power itself took an active share in the conquest. But however much stress the French laid upon this co-operation, they nevertheless also thought right not to break off negotiations, if Charles I should still be inclined again to defer his answer.