advantage to themselves. The advance of Baner into Bohemia in the summer of 1639, when he even made Vienna tremble; the further advance of the army of Bernard of Weimar, even after the death of its leader, and the danger with which it threatened Mainz, while in Westphalia and in Franconia the friends of the Emperor were kept down, and his enemies raised their heads:--all these events appeared to them to indicate the general victory of Protestantism, which indeed was their own victory also[159]. They were above all pleased that the Spanish fleet should be blockaded, and at last defeated on the English coast; for the embarrassment into which King Charles was thrown contributed to their security. But, it may be asked, had they not, besides the support which they found in the relations between the great Powers of the world, also received some special assurances from one side or the other? The French ambassador, Bellièvre, felt no hesitation in putting himself in alliance with the adversaries of King Charles in Scotland, in systematic opposition to the tendencies prevailing at the English court, which he regarded as dangerous to the interests of France. He was [A.D. 1639.] not, strictly speaking, authorised by his court to take this step. Yet he acted in the name of his court when he assisted a few Scots of the Covenanting party, with whom he had become acquainted in London, to go to Edinburgh, in order to further his designs among the members of the Assemblies in that city. He wished them to keep three objects before their eyes--the maintenance of the privileges of the Scots if the Pacification was brought to a final conclusion[160]; the renewal of the old alliance between France and Scotland; and lastly, a representation of the Scots in the English Privy Council. It is not to be supposed that the emissaries of Bellièvre exercised much direct influence upon the course of the transactions of the General Assembly or of the Parliament, for these bodies observed in their movements an internal consistency of their own; but no one will venture to deny that the leaders were encouraged to persevere in their course, even at the risk of breaking with their King, by the thought that in case of extremities they might reckon upon the support of France. Under these circumstances the maintenance of this alliance promoted their own security. As early as August 1639, Argyle, Lesley, and Rothes, addressed a letter to Bellièvre, in which they alleged circumstances as an excuse for the delay of the French enlistments in Scotland, about which Bellièvre had intentionally complained in terms intimating suspicion, though deeper than he himself felt, while at the same time, he referred to the old alliances between France and Scotland, which he said ought ‘not to be disturbed by any shadow of mistrust[161]. Towards the end of the year, King Charles refused to grant an audience to the Commissioners of the Parliament who came to London, not