Sundry resolutions corresponding to this idea were adopted by Parliament; for instance, in relation to ship-money[219], which was declared contrary to the laws of the realm, to the private rights of subjects, and to previous statutes. Care was taken to restore to those who had paid them the last raised contributions, which were still in the hands of the sheriffs. This gave the bench of judges greater security against arbitrary dismissal. But as the chief source of the evil was seen to lie in the long intermission of Parliaments and their abrupt dissolution, the most special care was directed towards making this impossible. The general feeling was that they could never long reckon on the good behaviour of the ministers unless the rod of responsibility was always hung over them, that otherwise their arbitrary power would in a short time grow again like Samson’s hair, and that the only means of keeping good ministers lay in the frequent repetition of Parliaments[220]. Demands similar to those of which the Scots had set the example, were made in England also, that Parliament should meet every three years. Neither the power to convoke nor the power to dissolve it was to be left entirely to the King’s pleasure. It was resolved that if the King had not summoned a Parliament before September 3 of the third year, the peers of the realm were to issue the necessary writs in the King’s name: should [A.D. 1641] they prove dilatory, the sheriffs of the counties and mayors of the towns were to order the elections: and in case even these did nothing, the burgesses and freeholders might come to the poll unsummoned. On the same principle Parliament was neither to be dissolved nor prorogued until the session had lasted fifty days, without the assent of both Houses. These proposed enactments met with some opposition from the Lords: but as they involved interests common to both Houses, they passed that House also. We are assured that the King was fully sensible of the injurious effect which these measures must have on himself[221]: he foresaw that the censorship to which his ministers and himself would be subjected every three years must destroy the freedom of his designs, and limit his authority over the people. When the bill was presented to him he showed himself extremely unwilling to accept it. But an outspoken refusal once before had stopped all further negotiations: moreover there was a feeling at court that it would have been better for the King himself if his ministers had had no option in this respect. Charles I was induced to give way on February 16; the clerk of the Parliament was instructed to utter the old Norman formula, ‘Le roi le veut.’