Another objection raised against the doctrine of momentariness is this, that a cause (e.g. seed) must wait for a number of other collocations of earth, water, etc., before it can produce the effect (e.g. the shoots) and hence the doctrine must fail. To this Ratnakîrtti replies that the seed does not exist before and produce the effect when joined by other collocations, but such is the special effectiveness of a particular seed-moment, that it produces both the collocations or conditions as well as the effect, the shoot. How a special seed-moment became endowed with such special effectiveness is to be sought in other causal moments which preceded it, and on which it was dependent. Ratnakîrtti wishes to draw attention to the fact that as one perceptual moment reveals a number of objects, so one causal moment may produce a number of effects. Thus he says that the inference that whatever has being is momentary is valid and free from any fallacy. It is not important to enlarge upon the second part of Ratnakîrtti's arguments in which he tries to show that the production of effects could not be explained if we did not suppose ___________________________________________________________________ [Footnote 1: The distinction between vicious and harmless infinites was known to the Indians at least as early as the sixth or the seventh century. Jayanta quotes a passage which differentiates the two clearly (_Nyâyamañjarî_, p. 22): "_mûlak@satikarîmâhuranavasthâm hi dû@sa@nam. mûlasiddhau tvarucyâpi nânavasthâ nivâryate._" The infinite regress that has to be gone through in order to arrive at the root matter awaiting to be solved destroys the root and is hence vicious, whereas if the root is saved there is no harm in a regress though one may not be willing to have it.] 161 all things to be momentary, for this is more an attempt to refute the doctrines of Nyâya than an elaboration of the Buddhist principles.