A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1Dasgupta, Surendranath
Religion
A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1
Dasgupta, Surendranath
Hindu philosophy; India -- Religion
by taking upon themselves particular vows, and the monks are
required to deliver sermons and explain the sacred texts in
the upâs'rayas (separate buildings for monks like the Buddhist
vihâras). The principle of extreme carefulness not to destroy any
living being has been in monastic life carried out to its very
last consequences, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in a
great measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being,
not even an insect, however troublesome. He will remove it carefully
without hurting it. The principle of not hurting any living
being thus bars them from many professions such as agriculture,
etc., and has thrust them into commerce [Footnote ref 1].
Life of Mahâvîra.
Mahâvîra, the last prophet of the Jains, was a K@sattriya of
the Jñâta clan and a native of Vais'âli (modern Besarh, 27 miles
north of Patna). He was the second son of Siddhârtha and Trîs'alâ.
The S'vetâmbaras maintain that the embryo of the Tîrtha@nkara
which first entered the womb of the Brahmin lady Devanandâ
was then transferred to the womb of Trîs'alâ. This story the
Digambaras do not believe as we have already seen. His parents
were the worshippers of Pârs'va and gave him the name Varddhamâna
(Vîra or Mahâvîra). He married Yas'odâ and had a daughter
by her. In his thirtieth year his parents died and with the permission
of his brother Nandivardhana he became a monk. After
twelve years of self-mortification and meditation he attained
omniscience (_kevala_, cf. _bodhi_ of the Buddhists). He lived to
preach for forty-two years more, and attained mok@sa (emancipation)
some years before Buddha in about 480 B.C. [Footnote ref 2].
The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology.
A thing (such as clay) is seen to assume various shapes and
to undergo diverse changes (such as the form of a jug, or
pan, etc.), and we have seen that the Chândogya Upani@sad held
that since in all changes the clay-matter remained permanent,
that alone was true, whereas the changes of form and state
were but appearances, the nature of which cannot be rationally
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._]
[Footnote 2: See Hoernlé's translation of _Uvâsagadasâo_, Jacobi, _loc.
cit_., and Hoernlé's article on the Âjîvakas, _E. R.E._ The S'vetâmbaras,
however, say that this date was 527 B.C. and the Digambaras place it
eighteen years later.]
174
demonstrated or explained. The unchangeable substance (e.g.
the clay-matter) alone is true, and the changing forms are mere
illusions of the senses, mere objects of name (_nâma-rûpa_) [Footnote ref
1]. What we call tangibility, visibility, or other sense-qualities,
have no real existence, for they are always changing, and are like mere
phantoms of which no conception can be made by the light of reason.
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