Regarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary to have five propositions, such as: (1) "the hill is fiery," (2) "because of smoke," (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the kitchen," (4) "this hill is smoky," (5) "therefore it is fiery," called respectively _pratijñâ, hetu, drs@tânta, upanaya_ and _nigamana_, except for the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two propositions which actually enter into the inferential process (_Prameyakamalamârta@n@da,_ pp. 108, 109). When we make an ____________________________________________________________________ [Footnote 1 _Prameyakamalamârta@n@da,_ pp. 8-11.] 186 inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected with the probandum either as coexistence (_sahabhâva_) or as invariable antecedence (_kramabhâva_) will from the mere statement of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an inference [Footnote ref 1]. As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all ignorance [Footnote ref 2]. Knowledge as Revelation. The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us. That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that _____________________________________________________________________