It appears, then, although in many cases the statutes are very imperfect, that of the fifty-three states and territories twelve have actually or nominally advanced the age of consent to eighteen; one to seventeen; twenty-two to sixteen; two to fifteen; thirteen to fourteen; while two still retain the low age of twelve and one that of ten years. It should everywhere be raised to eighteen or twenty-one--the age of legal majority for a woman in her business or political relations--by a statute as rigorous as that of Idaho or Kansas. A wide field for beneficent legislation therefore remains; and, although morality "can not be legislated into a people," it is precisely by wise measures of this character that the lawmaker can render powerful aid in the creation of an environment favorable to moral and social progress. _c_) _Resulting character of divorce legislation._--What has just been said regarding the function of social legislation applies with special force to the laws relating to divorce. Here, as in the case of marriage, there is a wide sphere of useful activity for the lawmaker. He cannot, it is true, reach the root of the matter: the fundamental causes of divorce which are planted deeply in the imperfections of the social system--particularly in false sentiments regarding marriage and the family--and which, as will presently appear, can only be removed through more rational principles and methods of education. He can, however, by carefully drawn and uniform statutes render the external conditions--the legal environment--favorable for the operation of the proper remedy. In this sense it is possible to have "good divorce laws," just as we may have good charity laws, good laws for the check of contagious diseases, or good laws in any department of remedial social legislation.[735] So far as their ethical content is concerned, good divorce laws, like any other, will not lead, but must follow at some distance, the highest moral sentiment of the community. They should, however, follow as closely as practicable in order to secure the obedience of all. In this field it is highly essential that the laws should be simple, certain, and uniform. They should not from their very nature become a dead letter, or even an encouragement to domestic discord, by offering opportunity for evasion, collusion, or lax interpretation. Statutes which are not in good faith executed, like those of France under the old _régime_, are always a fruitful source of social disorder. They tend to destroy the reverence for law itself. In this respect the divorce laws of many of the states are still defective, although decided progress has been made during the last twenty years. Within this period the foundation of what may some time become a common and effective divorce code for the whole Union has slowly been laid. Little by little, as the detailed discussion already presented in the seventeenth chapter reveals, more stringent provisions for