to measure exactly the effects of lax or restrictive legislation. The divorce movement is dependent upon social forces which lie far beyond the reach of the statute-maker. Yet it seems almost certain that there is a margin, very important though narrow, within which he may wisely exert a restraining influence. Good laws may, at any rate, check hasty impulse and force individuals to take proper time for reflection. They may also by securing publicity prevent manifold injustice in the granting of decrees. [773] WRIGHT, _Report_, 150 ff. [774] Including the repeal in 1878 of the celebrated Connecticut "omnibus clause" introduced in 1849. On the alleged influence of this clause see DIKE, "Facts as to Divorce in New England," in _Christ and Modern Thought_, 197-202; _idem_, "Some Aspects of the Divorce Problem," _Princeton Review_, March, 1884, 170, 171; and especially LOOMIS, "Divorce Legislation in Conn.," _New Englander_, XXV, 436 ff., 441, 442, giving a table of Connecticut divorces by counties, 1849-65; and ALLEN, "Divorce in New England," _North Am. Rev._, CXXX, 547 ff., giving statistics for the period 1860-78. [775] For example, Massachusetts created four new causes of divorce in 1870; and in 1873 reduced the time of desertion necessary to constitute a ground of divorce from five to three years. Divorces increased from 337 in 1872 to 611 in 1874. A part of this gain was probably due to the change in law, although in all the entire group of north Atlantic states there was at the same time a large increase which cannot be thus accounted for. The lax law of residence in Utah previous to 1878, and the reduction of the term of desertion from two years to one by the Dakota legislature in 1881, were each responsible for an increase in the divorce rate: compare WRIGHT, _Report_, 152 ff., 156, 203 ff.; WILLCOX, _A Study in Vital Statistics_, 85-90; _idem_, _The Divorce Problem_, 41-61; with the criticism of DIKE, "Legislation and Divorce," _New York Eve. Post_, July 2, 1891.