[364] But in _Laws_ (1848), 94, 95, the following case of legislative interference may be found: "The right is hereby given to Ludwig Brunileu to apply to the supreme court of this state, in equity, for a divorce from his wife Bertha, ... with the same effect and on the same footing in every respect, as if they had been married in this state, and the offence or offences complained of had been committed in this state, and within five years prior to the time of such application." [365] THOMPSON, _Laws of the Commonwealth of Pa._ (1804-6), VII, 73-75. [366] THOMPSON, _op. cit._, 326-28. [367] See, for example, _Acts_ (1808), 138, 140, 146 (for cruelty, force at marriage, etc.); _ibid._ (1810), 82, 89, 194 (insanity before and after marriage, imprisonment for crime, abuse, and abandonment); _ibid._ (1811-12), 28, 34, 143, 195, 198, 228, 231, 237; _ibid._ (1820-21), 3, 29, 35, 48, 139. It was in Delaware, however, that legislative divorce died the hardest death. By the act of 1832 the superior court was given "sole cognizance of granting divorces" for cruelty, abandonment, and some other causes; and in 1852 it was enacted that no "petition for a divorce shall be received or acted on by the general assembly for any cause cognizable" by that court, "nor without proof of one month's public notice of the intention to prefer such petition, by advertisements in a newspaper published within the county of the petitioner's residence, if there be one," or, if not, then in some other newspaper in the state.[368] Although this declaration of the assembly restricting its jurisdiction to cases not provided for by law was subsequently more than once repeated,[369] there was still a wide range for interference, even if the will of one legislature could bind that of another. The number of petitions granted waxed apace. In 1887 it was forty-two; in 1889, sixty-three; and two years later, forty-eight.[370] In the meantime a remedy was sought through appeal to constitutional interdict. Once the effort was almost successful. By an act of April 20, 1893, the assembly proposed an amendment to the constitution giving the supreme court exclusive jurisdiction in divorce suits, but only "for the causes and upon the conditions prescribed by the legislature.[371] This amendment failed of adoption; but its purpose was soon secured in the new constitution of 1897, which declares that "no divorce shall be granted, nor alimony allowed, except by the judgment of a court, as shall be prescribed by general and uniform law."[372] [368] _Rev. Stat. of Del._ (1852), 78. [369] _Ibid._ (1874), 150; _ibid._ (1893), 242. [370] _Laws_ (1887), 528-40; _ibid._ (1889), 1046-64; _ibid._ (1895), 300-308. [371] _Laws_ (1893), 617. [372] _Const. of the State of Del._ (1897), Art. II, sec. 18, p. 141.