Under the existing law of New York, for adultery, absolute divorce may be granted to either the husband or wife (1) when both were residents of the state at the time of the offense; (2) when the marriage took place within the state; (3) when the plaintiff was a resident of the state when the offense was committed, and so remains at the commencement of the suit; (4) where the offense was committed in the state and the person injured is a resident thereof when the action is brought. In the first instance the judgment is "interlocutory;" and three months must elapse before it can be made final.[377] Remarriage is allowed only under the same conditions as in 1813 and 1827, except that now the law does not "prevent the remarriage of the parties to the action." At present suit for partial divorce may be brought by either spouse, and not by the wife only, as under the earlier laws. The grounds allowed are (1) cruel and inhuman treatment; (2) conduct rendering it unsafe and improper for the plaintiff to cohabit with the defendant; (3) abandonment; (4) where the wife is plaintiff, the neglect or refusal of the husband to provide for her.[378] When the marriage takes place out of the state the provision of 1827-28 requiring one year's previous residence of the parties and actual residence of the plaintiff at the commencement of the action is still maintained.[379] [377] So required by _Laws_ (1902), II, chap. 364; STOVER, _Code of Civil Proced._ (1902), II, sec. 1774, p. 1863. [378] It has been decided in Kennedy _v._ Kennedy, 73 _N. Y._, 363, affirming 47 _N. Y. Supr._, 56, that "threats of violence of such a character as to induce a reasonable apprehension of bodily injury, and charges of infidelity, made in bad faith, as auxiliary to and in aggravation of the threatened violence, are sufficient to constitute 'cruel and inhuman treatment.'" _Cf._ STOVER, _Code of Civil Proced._ (1892), II, 1639, 1640, note. A "groundless and malicious charge against a wife's chastity, and spitting upon her are gross acts of cruelty, and words of menace accompanied by the probability of bodily violence, if they inflict indignity and threaten pain, are sufficient." See Whispell _v._ Whispell, 4 BARB., 217; and _cf._ Lutz _v._ Lutz, 31 _N. Y. St. Rep._, 718; Waltermire _v._ Waltermire, 110 _N. Y._, 183; Uhlmann _v._ Uhlmann, 17 _Abb. N. C._, 236; Mason _v._ Mason, 1 EDW., _Ch._, 278; Perry _v._ Perry, 2 BARB., _Ch._, 311. [379] STOVER, _Code of Civil Proced._ (1902), II, 1846.