A History of Mediaeval Jewish PhilosophyHusik, Isaac
ReligionJewish
A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy
Husik, Isaac
Philosophy, Jewish; Philosophy, Medieval
Prime matter, therefore, represents the first stage in creation. The
next stage is the endowment of this formless matter with corporeality in
the abstract, _i. e._, with extension. Then come the specific forms of
the four elements, then their compounds through mineral, plant and
animal to man. This is not new; we have already met with it in Gabirol
and Ibn Zaddik. Nor is the following significant statement altogether
new, though no one before Ibn Daud expressed it so clearly and so
definitely. It is that the above analysis of natural objects into
matter, universal body, the elements, and so on, is not a physical
division but a logical. It does not mean that there was a time when
prime matter actually existed as such before it received the form of
corporeality, and then there existed actually an absolute body of pure
extension until it received the four elements. No, nothing has existence
_in actu_ which has not individuality, including not only form, but also
accidents. The above analysis is theoretical, and the order of priority
is logical not real. In reality only the complete compound of matter and
form (the individual) exists.
Allusion to matter and form is also found in the Bible in Jeremiah (18,
1ff.), "Arise and go down to the potter's house.... Then I went down to
the potter's house, and, behold, he wrought his work on the wheels....
Behold as the clay in the potter's hand...."[233]
The next important topic analyzed by Ibn Daud is that of motion. This is
of especial importance to Ibn Daud because upon it he bases a new proof
of the existence of God, not heretofore found in the works of any of his
predecessors. It is taken from Aristotle's Physics, probably from
Avicenna's treatises on the subject, is then adopted by Maimonides, and
through his example no doubt is made use of by Thomas Aquinas, the great
Christian Scholastic of the thirteenth century, who gives it the most
prominent place in his "Summa Contra Gentiles."
Ibn Daud does not give Aristotle's general definition of motion as the
"actualization of the potential qua potential" (_cf._ above, p. xxxii),
but his other remarks concerning it imply it. Motion, he says, is
applied first to movement in place, and is then transferred to any
change which is gradual, such as quantitative or qualitative change.
Sudden change is not called motion. As the four elements have all the
same matter and yet possess different motions--earth and water moving
downward, fire and air upward--it cannot be the matter which is the
cause of their motions. It must therefore be the forms, which are
different in different things.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account