A History of Mediaeval Jewish PhilosophyHusik, Isaac
ReligionJewish
A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy
Husik, Isaac
Philosophy, Jewish; Philosophy, Medieval
13. None of the kinds of change mentioned in 4 is continuous except
motion of translation; and of this only circular motion.
14. Motion of translation is the first by nature of the motions. For
genesis and decay presuppose qualitative change; and qualitative change
presupposes the approach of the agent causing the change to the thing
undergoing the change. And there is no growth or diminution without
antecedent genesis and decay.
15. Time is an accident following motion and connected with it. The one
cannot exist without the other. No motion except in time, and time
cannot be conceived except with motion. Whatever has no motion does not
come under time.
16. Whatever is incorporeal cannot be subject to number, unless it is a
corporeal power; in which case the individual powers are numbered with
their matters or bearers. Hence the separate forms or Intelligences,
which are neither bodies nor corporeal powers, cannot have the
conception of number connected with them, except when they are related
to one another as cause and effect.
17. Everything that moves, necessarily has a mover, either outside, like
the hand moving the stone, or inside like the animal body, which
consists of a mover, the soul, and a moved, the body proper. Every
_mobile_ of the last kind is called a self-moving thing. This means that
the motor element in the thing is part of the whole thing in motion.
18. If anything passes from potentiality to actuality, the agent that
caused this must be outside the thing. For if it were inside and there
was no obstruction, the thing would never be potential, but always
actual; and if there was an obstruction, which was removed, the agency
which removed the obstruction is the cause which caused the thing to
pass from potentiality to actuality.
19. Whatever has a cause for its existence is a "possible" existent in
so far as itself is concerned. If the cause is there, the thing exists;
if not, it does not. Possible here means not necessary.
20. Whatever is a necessary existent in itself, has no cause for its
existence.
21. Every composite has the cause of its existence in the composition.
Hence it is not in itself a necessary existent; for its existence is
dependent upon the existence of its constituent parts and upon their
composition.
22. All body is composed necessarily of two things, matter and form; and
it necessarily has accidents, _viz._, quantity, figure, situation.
23. Whatever is potential and has in it a possibility may at some time
not exist as an actuality.
24. Whatever is potential is necessarily possessed of matter, for
possibility is always in matter.
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