A History of Mediaeval Jewish PhilosophyHusik, Isaac
ReligionJewish
A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy
Husik, Isaac
Philosophy, Jewish; Philosophy, Medieval
Four things must be removed from God: (1) corporeality, (2) affection,
(3) potentiality, (4) resemblance to his creatures. The first we have
already proved. The second implies change, and the author of the change
cannot be the same as he who suffers the change and feels the affection.
If then God were subject to affection, there would be another who would
cause the change in him. So all want must be removed from him; for he
who is in want of something is potential, and in order to pass into
actuality requires an agent having that quality _in actu_. The fourth is
also evident; for resemblance involves relation. As there is no relation
between God and ourselves, there is no resemblance. Resemblance can
exist only between things of the same species. All the expressions
including "existent" are applied to God and to ourselves in a homonymous
sense (_cf._ above, p. 240). The use is not even analogical; for in
analogy there must be some resemblance between the things having the
same name, but not so here. Existence in things which are determined by
causes (and this includes all that is not God), is not identical with
the essence of those things. The essence is that which is expressed in
the definition, whereas the existence or non-existence of the thing so
defined is not part of the definition. It is an accident added to the
essence. In God the case is different. His existence has no cause, since
he is a necessary existent; hence his existence is identical with his
essence. So we say God exists, but not with existence, as we do.
Similarly he is living, but not with life; knowing, but not with
knowledge; powerful, but not with power; wise, but not with wisdom.
Unity and plurality are also accidents of things which are one or many
as the case may be. They are accidents of the category of quantity. God,
who is a necessary existent and simple cannot be one any more than many.
He is one, but not with unity. Language is inadequate to express our
ideas of God. Wishing to say he is not many, we have to say he is one;
though one as well as many pertains to the accidents of quantity. To
correct the inexactness of the expression, we add, "but not with unity."
So we say "eternal" to indicate that he is not "new," though in reality
eternal is an accident of time, which in turn is an accident of motion,
the latter being dependent upon body. In reality neither "eternal" nor
"new" is applicable to God. When we say one, we mean merely that there
is none other like him; and when Scripture speaks of him as the first
and the last, the meaning is that he does not change.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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