A History of Philosophy in EpitomeSchwegler, Albert
Philosophy
A History of Philosophy in Epitome
Schwegler, Albert
Philosophy -- History
3. THE PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY.—The universe is thus the sum of all the
monads. Every thing, every composite, is an aggregate of monads. Thus
every bodily organism is not one substance, but many, it is a
multiplicity of monads, like a machine which is made up of a number of
distinct pieces of mechanism. Leibnitz compared bodies to a fish-pond,
which might be full of living elements, though dead itself. The ordinary
view of things is thus wholly set aside; the truly substantial does not
belong to bodies, _i. e._ to the aggregates, but to their original
elements. Matter, in the vulgar sense, as something conceived to be
without mind, does not at all exist. How now must the inner connection
of the universe be conceived? In the following way. Every monad is a
representative being, and at the same time, each one is different from
every other. This difference, therefore, depends alone upon the
difference of representation: there are just as many different degrees
of representation as there are monads, and these degrees may be fixed
according to some of their prominent stages. The representations may be
classified according to the distinction between confused and distinct
knowledge. Hence a monad of the lowest rank (a monad _toute nue_) will
be one which _simply_ represents, _i. e._ which stands on the stage of
most confused knowledge. Leibnitz compares this state with a swoon, or
with our condition in a dreamy sleep, in which we are not without
representations, (notions)—for otherwise we could have none when
awaking—but in which the representations are so numerous that they
neutralize each other and do not come into the consciousness. This is
the stage of inorganic nature. In a higher rank are those monads in
which the representation is active as a formative vital force, though
still without consciousness. This is the stage of the vegetable world.
Still higher ascends the life of the monad when it attains to sensation
and memory, as is the case in the animal kingdom. The lower monads may
be said to sleep, and the brute monads to dream. When still farther the
soul rises to reason or reflection, we call it mind, spirit.—The
distinction of the monads from each other is, therefore, this, that each
one, though mirroring the whole and the same universe in itself, does it
from a different point of view, and, therefore, differently, the one
more, and the rest less perfectly. Each one is a different centre of the
world which it mirrors. Each one contains the whole universe, the whole
infinity within itself, and in this respect is like God, the only
difference being that God knows every thing with perfect distinctness,
while the monad represents it confusedly, though one monad may represent
it more confusedly than another. The limitation of a monad does not,
therefore, consist in its containing less than another or than God, but
only in its containing more imperfectly or in its representing less
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