The relation between Herbart and Hegel is very clear at this point. Both are agreed respecting the contradictory nature of the determinations of thought, and the conceptions of experience. But from this point they separate. It is the nature of these conceptions as of every thing, says Hegel, to be an inner contradiction; becoming, for instance, is essentially the unity of being, and not being, &c. This is impossible, says Herbart, on the other side, so long as the principle of contradiction is valid; if the conceptions of experience contain inner contradictions, this is not the fault of the objective world, but of the representing subject who must rectify his false apprehension by remodelling these conceptions, and eliminating the contradiction. Herbart thus charges the philosophy of Hegel with empiricism, because it receives from experience these contradictory conceptions unchanged, and not only regards these as established, but even goes so far as to metamorphose logic on their account, and this simply because they are given in experience, though their contradictory nature is clearly seen. Hegel and Herbart stand related to each other as Heraclitus and Parmenides (_cf._ § § VI. and VII.) 4. HERBART’S REALS.—From this point Herbart reaches his “reals” (_Realen_) as follows: To discover the contradictions, he says, in all our conceptions of experience, might lead us to absolute scepticism, and to despair of the truth. But here we remember that if the existence of every thing real be denied, then the appearance, sensation, representation, and thought itself would be destroyed. We perceive, therefore, just as strong an indication of being as of appearance. We cannot, indeed, ascribe to the given any true and essential being _per se_, it is not _per se_ alone, but only on, or in, or through something other. _The truly being_ is an absolute being, which as such excludes every thing relative and dependent; it is _absolute position_, which it is not for us first to posit, but only to recognize. In so far as this being is attributed to any thing, this latter possesses reality. The truly being is, therefore, ever a _quale_, a something which is considered as being. In order now that this posited may correspond to the conditions which lie in the conception of absolute position, the _what_ of the real must be thought (_a_) as absolutely positive or affirmative, _i. e._ without any negation or limitation, which might destroy again the absoluteness; (_b_) as absolutely simple, _i. e._ in no way, as a multiplicity or admitting of inner antitheses; (_c_) as indeterminate by any conceptions of greatness, _i. e._ not as a quantum which may be divided and extended in time and space; hence, also, not as a constant greatness or continuity. But we must never forget that this being or this absolute reality is not simply something thought, but is something independent and resting on itself, and hence it is simply to be recognized by the thinking.