A few words may be said here with regard to the situation generally, and the attitude of the population. From Muka, the Sherip Masahor, the friend and connection of Pangiran Nipa, could look for strong support. In the Rejang he had on his side the Kanowits, the Banyoks, and the Segalangs, the last a hot-headed and treacherous people, who had always been the Sherip's most active partisans, and were afterwards his only sympathists; upon the Dayaks it was naturally thought he could count, but, as regards those of the Kanowit, events proved this to be a mistake; amongst the Melanaus of the delta he had a strong following at Igan, Matu, and Bruit, but not at the other villages; and the Malays of Serikei feared and obeyed him, though from their chiefs downwards they hated him. The Kalaka Malays, under a bad leader, were very doubtful. Those in Saribas were held in check by the Dayaks, who had been converted by the Tuan Muda from stout enemies into staunch friends; the Sea-Dayaks generally were as true as steel to their white chief, though some were led astray. The Sekrang Malays were faithful, but the Lingga Malays had allowed themselves to be awed by letters that had been sent them by the conspirators, calling upon them to assist in killing the English or to expect the consequences. Though they received these letters they made no response to the overtures, and were at heart with the Government. Sadong, where there had been no English officer for some time, was, under the Bandar Kasim, a hotbed of anarchy, and here were the Datu Haji's principal adherents, as also were the Land-Dayaks of Lundu. In Kuching and its neighbourhood the Malays were as usual loyal, from their Datus, the Bandar, Imaum (whose sister the Datu Haji had married) and the old fighting Temanggong downwards. Here the Datu Haji had a small clique only, but men's minds were becoming disturbed by the baneful rumours that were being sedulously spread about of the impending downfall of the Government. It was brought home to their minds, and insisted on, that the Rajah had forfeited the confidence of the British Government, which was prepared to leave him to his fate. No more men-of-war had been sent to Sarawak, and no help had been offered the Rajah for the suppression of the Chinese insurrection; all this exercised a bad influence on some who wavered, though at heart loyal, and it discouraged the faint-hearted, just as it encouraged hopes in the disaffected Malay chiefs and the Sherips that they might recover their lost supremacy. Any signal reverse to the Government, or any indecision shown by it, would have produced the gravest consequences, which must have resulted, however the issue went, in the ruin of the country. The crisis was critical, and without a strong man at the helm, disaster would have followed—a leader to counterbalance the influence of the conspirators—a leader for the loyal to rally around and to inspire the timid, was wanted, and was at hand.