The bearing of his work on the British empire lies chiefly in his
careful survey of the east coast of Australia, which he laid claim
to in the name of King George, and the circumnavigation of New
Zealand, which later gave title to the British claim on those islands.
Thus, while the American colonies in the west were winning their
independence, another territory in the east, far more extensive,
was being brought under British sway, destined in another century
to become important dominions of the empire. The Dutch had a claim
of priority in discovery through the early voyages of Tasman, but
they attempted no colonization and Dutch sea power was too weak
to make good a technical claim in the face of England's navy.
Finally, when the results of a century of wars between France and
England are summarized, we find that France had lost all her great
domain in America except a few small islands in the West Indies.
In brief, it is due to British control of the sea during the 18th
century that practically all of the continent north of the Rio
Grande is English in speech, laws, and tradition.
This control of the sea exercised by England was not the gift of
fortune. It was a prize gained, in the main, by wise policy in
peace and hard fighting in war. France had the opportunity to wrest
from England the control of the sea as England had won it from
Holland, for France at the close of the 17th century dominated
Europe. In population and in wealth she was superior to her rival.
But the arrogance of her king kept her embroiled in futile wars on
the Continent, with little energy left for the major issue, the
conquest of the sea. Finally, when the war of American Independence
left her a free hand to concentrate on her navy as against that of
England, France lost through the fatal weakness of policy which
corrupted all her officers with the single brilliant exception of
Suffren. The French naval officer avoided battle on principle,
and when he could not avoid it he accepted the defensive. To the
credit of the English officer be it said that, as a rule, he sought
the enemy and took the aggressive; he had the "fighting spirit."
This difference between French and British commanders had as much
to do with the ultimate triumph of England on the sea as anything
else. It retrieved many a blunder in strategy and tactics by sheer
hard hitting.
The history of the French navy points a moral applicable to any
service and any time. When a navy encourages the idea that ships
must not be risked, that a decisive battle must be avoided because
of what might happen in case of defeat, it is headed for the same
fate that overwhelmed the French.
REFERENCES
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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