The almost decisive advantage thus gained is evident from the confusion
which then reigned in Aboukir Bay. In spite of the repeated letters
from Bonaparte urging him to secure his fleet in Alexandria harbor,
in spite of repeated soundings which showed this course possible,
the French Admiral Brueys with a kind of despondent inertia still
lay in this exposed anchorage at the Rosetta mouth of the Nile.
Mortars and cannon had been mounted on Aboukir point, but it was
known that their range did not cover the head of the French line.
The frigates and scout vessels that might have given more timely
warning were at anchor in the bay. Numerous water parties were
on shore and with them the ships' boats needed to stretch cables
from one vessel to another and rig gear for winding ships, as had
been vaguely planned. At a hurried council it was proposed to put
to sea, but this was given up for the sufficient reason that there
was no time. The French were cleared for action only on the out-board
side. Their admiral was chiefly fearful of attack in the rear, a
fear reasonable enough if his ships had been sailing before the
wind at sea; but at anchor, with the Aboukir batteries ineffective
and the wind blowing directly down the line, attack upon the van
would be far more dangerous, since support could less easily be
brought up from the rear.
[Illustration: COAST MAP
From Alexandria to Rosetta Mouth of the Nile]
It was on the head of the line that the attack came. Nelson had
given the one signal that "his intention was to attack the van
and center as they lay at anchor, according to the plan before
developed." This plan called for doubling, two ships to the enemy's
one. With a fair wind from the north-northwest Captain Foley in
the _Goliath_ at 6 p.m. reached the _Guerrier_, the headmost of
the thirteen ships in the enemy line. Either by instant initiative,
or more likely in accordance with previous plans in view of such an
opportunity, he took his ship inside the line, his anchor dragging
slightly so as to bring him up on the quarter of the second enemy
vessel, the _Conquerant_. The _Zealous_, following closely,
anchored on the bows of the _Guerrier_; the _Orion_ engaged inside
the fifth ship; the _Theseus_ inside the third; and the _Audacious_,
passing between the first two of the enemy, brought up on the
_Conquerant's_ bow. With these five engaged inside, Nelson in the
_Vanguard_ and the two ships following him engaged respectively
outside the third, fourth and fifth of the enemy. Thus the concentration
on the van was eight to five.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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