A History of the British Army, Vol. 1: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' WarFortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
A History of the British Army, Vol. 1: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' War
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Great Britain -- History, Military; Great Britain. Army -- History
The following year saw the war renewed. This time the farce of
calling out a feudal body of horse was not repeated, but unexpected
difficulties were encountered in raising the levies of foot.
In 1639 the infantry had been drawn chiefly from the northern
counties, where the tradition of eternal feuds with the Scots made
men not altogether averse to a march to the Border. But in 1640
the trained bands of the southern counties were called upon, and
they had no such feeling. It is possible that unusual rigour was
employed in the process of impressment, for the authorities had
been warned, after experience of the previous year, to allow no
captains to play the Falstaff with their recruits. Be that as it
may, the recalcitrance of the new levies was startling. From county
after county came complaints of riot and disorder. The Wiltshire
men seized the opportunity to live by robbery and plunder; the
Dorsetshire men murdered an officer who had corrected a drummer
for flagrant insubordination; in Suffolk the recruits threatened
to murder the deputy-lieutenant; in London, Kent, Surrey, and
half a dozen more counties the resistance to service was equally
determined; and when finally in July four thousand men reached the
rendezvous at Selby, old Sir Jacob Astley could only designate them
as the arch-knaves of the country. Money being of course very
scarce, the men were ill-clothed and ill-found, and their numbers
were soon thinned by systematic desertion. A new difficulty cropped
up in the matter of discipline. Lord Conway, who commanded the
horse, had executed a man for mutiny; he now found that his action
was illegal and that he required the royal pardon. If, he wrote,
the lawyers are right and martial law is impossible in England, it
would be best to break up the army forthwith: to hand men over to
the civil power is to deliver them to the lawyers, and experience
of the ship-money has shown what support could be expected from
them.
There, in fact, lay the kernel of the whole matter; indiscipline
was not only rife in the ranks but widespread throughout the
nation. From long carelessness and neglect the organisation of the
country for defence by land and sea had become not only obsolete
but impossible and absurd. For centuries the old vessel had been
patched and tinkered and filed and riveted, occasionally by
statute, more often by royal authority only, but chiefly by mere
habit and custom. But now that the reaction which had established
the new monarchy was over, and men, stirred by a counter-reaction,
subjected the military system to the fierce heat of constitutional
tests, the whole fabric fell asunder in an instant, and brought the
new monarchy down headlong in its fall. The story is so instructive
to a nation which has not yet given its standing army a permanent
statutory existence, that it is worth while very briefly to trace
the progress of the catastrophe.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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