A History of the British Army, Vol. 1: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' WarFortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
A History of the British Army, Vol. 1: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' War
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Great Britain -- History, Military; Great Britain. Army -- History
Peace having been signed, there arose the momentous question,
what should be done with the Army. To understand aright the
attitude of Parliament towards it, a brief sketch must be given
of its relations therewith apart from the mere question of voting
supplies. It has been seen that the scandals of Schomberg's first
campaign had opened the eyes of Parliament to the iniquities that
were then going forward; but, though a scape-goat had been made
of the Commissary-General, the matter had not been sifted to the
bottom.
The primary and principal difficulty was, of course, lack of money.
In the case of the Irish war this had been overcome by grants of
the Irish estates which had been forfeited after the conquest, the
mere expectation and hope of which had sufficed to set the minds
of many creditors at rest. For the war in Flanders, however, there
was no such resource. The treasury was empty, and the funds voted
by Parliament were so remote that they could only be assigned to
creditors in security for payment at some future time. Many of
these creditors, however, were tradesmen who could not afford to
wait until tallies should be issued in course of payment, and were
therefore compelled to dispose of these securities at a ruinous
discount. The mischief naturally did not end there. Capitalists
soon discovered that to buy tallies at huge discount was a much
more profitable business than to lend money direct to the State
at the rate of seven per cent, and accordingly devoted all their
money to it. Thus the "tally-traffic," as it was called, grew
so formidable that the Lord Treasurer, Godolphin, was obliged
secretly to offer larger interest for loans than was authorised by
Parliament.[269]
The result of this financial confusion was that the close of every
campaign found the Army in Flanders in a miserable state, owing to
the exhaustion of its money and its credit. When it is remembered
that a large proportion of the pay of officers and men was kept
on principle one year in arrear, that they had to pay discount
for anticipation of its payment at the best of times, and that to
this charge was now added the further discount on the tallies of
the State, it will be seen that their loss became very serious.
The incessant difficulties of all ranks from want of their pay and
arrears gave rise to much discontent and frequently hampered active
operations. Officers were obliged to sell the horses, which they
had bought for purposes of transport, before the campaign opened,
and were very often driven to supply not only themselves but their
men out of their own pockets.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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