A History of the British Army, Vol. 2: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' WarFortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
A History of the British Army, Vol. 2: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' War
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Great Britain -- History, Military; Great Britain. Army -- History
Hawley was soon able to report that the whole of his force
had recovered itself with the exception of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Dragoons, which appear to have been hopelessly
demoralised. Nor can it be denied that the General's remedies were
stern enough. "There are fourteen deserters taken," he wrote, a
fortnight after the action, "shall they be hanged? Thirty-one of
Hamilton's dragoons are to be hanged for deserting to the rebels,
and thirty-two of the foot to be shot for cowardice."[219] Still
it was felt that there was but one way thoroughly to restore the
spirit of the troops, namely that the Duke of Cumberland should
take command of them in person. The Duke no sooner received his
orders than he hurried to Edinburgh, travelling night and day with
such speed that he accomplished the journey from London in less
than six days. Neither he nor the King blamed Hawley. Indiscipline
was in his opinion the reason for the failure, and he came up to
Scotland fully resolved to put an end to it. He seems in fact to
have joined the army, asking in scornful and indignant surprise
what was the meaning of this foolish flight of English infantry
before wild Highlanders: and this attitude was almost sufficient in
itself to put the soldiers upon their mettle.
[Sidenote: Feb. 1/12.]
Hawley had made all preparations for an advance against the Duke's
arrival, and on the 31st of January Cumberland moved forward to
Falkirk with twelve battalions of foot, two regiments of dragoons,
in which neither the Thirteenth nor the Fourteenth was included,
and several companies of loyal Highlanders. The rebels thereupon
raised the siege of Stirling and retired, much against the will
of Charles, to Inverness, leaving their battering guns in the
trenches behind them. Cumberland at once sent forward his dragoons
in pursuit, and pushed on as rapidly as possible to Perth. He
was in no amiable mood, and gave an indication of his feelings
towards the rebels by granting his troops licence to plunder the
estates of rebel leaders on the march.[220] Arriving at Perth he
was detained for several days by the difficulty of collecting
supplies and transport. Nevertheless the campaign was at last to
be conducted with common sense. Cumberland was careful to give his
troops special training against their enemy, prescribing for the
infantry the formation so successfully adopted by the Fourth and
Forty-eighth at Falkirk, and directing that when at close quarters
with Highlanders each soldier should turn his bayonet not against
the enemy immediately before him, but against the man on his own
right front, where the target could not parry the thrust. But this,
though creditable to Cumberland, was of small importance compared
to the change in the general situation. The rebels were in full
retreat from the fertile lowlands into the barren mountains, and
their supplies from France were cut off by British ships of war,
while Cumberland's force was fed from the sea. When one army is
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