A History of the British Army, Vol. 2: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' WarFortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
A History of the British Army, Vol. 2: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' War
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Great Britain -- History, Military; Great Britain. Army -- History
Though the expedition had been decided upon in July, it was not
until two months later that it sailed from England, and meanwhile
the troops waited as usual in the Isle of Wight.[280] There was
much delay in providing transports, and the embarkation was so
ill-managed that the troops were obliged to row a full mile to
their ships. On the 8th of September, however, the vessels put
to sea under convoy of sixteen sail of the line under Sir Edward
Hawke, and after much delay from foul winds and calms anchored in
Basque Roads, the haven which was to become famous half a century
later for an attack of a very different kind. On the 23rd the
fortifications of the Isle d'Aix were battered down by the fleet
and the island itself captured; but therewith the operations came
abruptly to an end. Fresh information revealed that the French were
fully prepared to meet an attack on Rochefort; and a council of war
decided that any attempt to take it by escalade would be hopeless.
It was therefore decided to attack the forts at the mouth of the
Charente, but the order was countermanded by Mordaunt; and after
a week's delay Hawke gave the General to understand that unless
operations were prosecuted forthwith he would return with the fleet
to England. The military commanders thereupon decided that they
would return with him, which on the 1st of October they did, to
the huge indignation of both fleet and army. A court of inquiry
was held over this absurd issue to such extensive and costly
preparations, and Sir John Mordaunt was tried by court-martial
but honourably acquitted. The incident gave rise to a fierce
war of pamphlets. It is certain that Mordaunt showed remarkable
supineness, and he was suspected of a wish to injure the influence
of Pitt by turning the enterprise into ridicule; but with such
men as Wolfe, Conway and Cornwallis among the senior officers,
the only conclusion is that, in the view of military men, no
object of the least value could have been gained by any operations
whatever. Military opinion had been against the expedition from
the first. Ligonier, a daring officer but of ripe experience and
sound judgment, wrote of it in the most lukewarm terms as likely to
lead to nothing. On the whole it seems that the troops were sent
on a fool's errand, and that the blame lay solely with Pitt. The
nation was furious, and the King showed marked coldness towards the
generals who had taken part in the failure; but Pitt, who was more
hurt and disappointed than any one, took no step except to promote
Wolfe, who had advocated active measures, over the heads of several
other officers, and thus in one way at least extracted good from
evil.
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