A History of the British Army, Vol. 2: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' WarFortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
A History of the British Army, Vol. 2: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' War
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Great Britain -- History, Military; Great Britain. Army -- History
The American troops, which formed a third of the whole force,
were incomparably worse than the worst of the English, and being
made up to some extent of Irish papists were more than a little
untrustworthy. Again, although the least foresight must have shown
that the brunt of the work would fall upon the artillery, the
gunners furnished to Wentworth were raw yokels, just caught up from
the plough and wholly ignorant of their duty, while their commander
was incapable, and his second a drunkard. Of the engineers it is
sufficient to repeat that after the chief was killed not one could
be found with the slightest knowledge of his duty. Moreover, of
the eight battering cannon furnished to him one was found to be
unserviceable and the rest were all of different patterns, while
the shells, like the hand-grenades, were of bad quality. Again, the
stores of all kinds were so unspeakably bad as to call forth the
bitterest complaints from Wentworth; and beyond all doubt bad food
contributed to increase the sickliness of the Army and to weaken
the men against the attacks of yellow fever. In fact, the trail
of the incompetent Newcastle is over the whole expedition; but
these blunders and deficiencies only the less excuse Wentworth for
failing to adopt a swifter and more dashing system of operations.
[Illustration: CARTHAGENA 1741.
_From a contemporary plan by
Capt. Ph. Durrell._
_Walker & Boutall del._ _To face page 78._
]
Vernon, on his side, boasted loudly that had he been invested
with the sole command he would have accomplished every object at
a far lower sacrifice of life; and it is probable that he spoke
truth. Certainly he never ceased to impress upon Wentworth
the necessity for bold and active measures. Nevertheless it was
Vernon who was mainly responsible for the fatal friction between
army and navy. He seems to have been by nature a bully; imperious,
conceited, insolent, and without an idea of tact. The ill-feeling
between the two services had shown itself before the expedition
joined Vernon's fleet at Jamaica; and the Thirty-fourth regiment,
which had been detailed for service on the men-of-war, lost half
of its numbers through ill-usage on board ship before a shot was
fired. It would have been a sufficiently difficult task for Vernon
to have composed these differences, but far from attempting it he
set himself deliberately to aggravate them. Still, when the whole
history of the expedition is examined the blame for its failure
must rest not with the General, not with the Admiral, not even
with the Government, but with those benighted and unscrupulous
politicians who gambled away the efficiency of the Army and of the
military administration for the petty triumphs of party and the
petty emoluments of place and power.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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