A History of the Coldstream Guards, from 1815 to 1895Ross, J. (John)
History
A History of the Coldstream Guards, from 1815 to 1895
Ross, J. (John)
Great Britain -- History -- Victoria, 1837-1901; Great Britain. Army. Coldstream Guards
more difficult to storm, for here the ground could be swept with fire,
and the defenders had every facility for making counter-attacks. The
tops of the hills form a wide plateau, stretching southwards towards the
Katcha river, indented only near the angle, by a depression between the
Kurgané and Telegraph Hills, through which the post-road rises, as it
proceeds to Sevastopol.[226]
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Footnote 225:
See Map No. 4, p. 174.
Footnote 226:
Hamley, _War in the Crimea_, p. 47, etc.
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The Russian army, numerically weaker than the Allies, being 33,000
infantry, 3400 cavalry, and 120 guns, occupied the plateau. The main
portion, 21,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and 84 guns, was placed on
Kurgané and on the post-road, opposite the English section; the
remainder, 12000 infantry, 400 cavalry, and 36 guns, near the post-road
and on Telegraph Hill, were opposed to the French. The cavalry took post
on the enemy’s right and rear, supported by horse artillery; but no
troops were further to the west, where the ground was under fire from
the war-ships. Menshikoff, however, forgot, though he had time at his
disposal, to block the roads which ascend the cliff and the rough
precipitous hillsides opposite the French position. Nor did he construct
fieldworks on his front and right flank, contenting himself with only
two gun-epaulments on Kurgané, one of which, about 300 yards from the
river, was armed with 14 heavy guns of position.
There was a pause when the Allies approached the position they were
about to assail, during which the troops refreshed themselves with cold
pork and biscuits, after their march on a warm and glorious morning. In
the interval, all eyes were turned to the heights that frowned in front,
and saw in the distance the hostile sharpshooters extended along the
river, in the vineyards and gardens, through which the advance was about
to be made. Nor were we unconscious that the whole of our force was
easily to be discerned, and our intentions to be divined by our
antagonist; for we halted boldly on the sloping plain, in full view of
the enemy, who, perched on the higher ground, was enabled to make his
observations and to conceal much of his own order of battle from our
anxious gaze. Meanwhile, the two Commanders-in-chief were concerting
their plans. They had met before, but this was their final consultation.
St. Arnaud had fixed and strong ideas on the situation; he was voluble
in expressing them, and, though zealous and brave, he was somewhat
shallow and self-opinionated. Lord Raglan’s first care was to insure a
good understanding with his impetuous colleague. He was hampered by the
alliance; and there was no supreme Commander to give a decision at this
moment when unity of action was indispensably necessary. The Chiefs
parted, and came to no definite conclusion; unless a hazy understanding
can be called so, that the French were to try and turn the Russian left,
but that the British could not do the same thing on the other flank
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