The latter, on the other hand, had received a few reinforcements, but not sufficient to compensate for the immense losses to which they had been subjected. On the evening of the 4th, they numbered but 58,000 infantry,—16,000 British, 31,000 French, and 11,000 Turks; and this small force was further weakened by the fact that the allied Commanders, totally unacquainted with the warlike qualities of their Ottoman auxiliaries, would not allow them to develop their value, and left them no chance to assist in the approaching battle. So far did Lord Raglan’s prejudice go, that the 6000 attached to the British army, were not suffered to take part as combatants, and when Omar Pasha proposed to send him a further contingent he refused the offer.[266] Hence there were practically only 47,000 British and French infantry left to meet the grave crisis which now confronted us. These troops were disposed on an irregular curve which stretched from Streleska Bay (north of Kamiesh Bay) along the front of the enemy’s lines of Sevastopol to the heights of Inkerman, thence southwards on the Sapuné Ridge to the Col, where it ran more to the east, near Kadikeui, and covered Balaklava. This line measured twenty miles in length, it was unsupported by any central reserve, and was everywhere in contact with powerful masses of the enemy. ----- Footnote 266: Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , 128; _Kinglake_ , v. 33, 34 note, 41 note. Sir Evelyn Wood says, in his recent publication, that he has “never understood why these Moslems, who came out so grandly at Silistria, were considered unfit to fight alongside the English and French troops” (Wood, _Crimea in 1854 and 1894_ , p. 199). -----