line from the British Left Attack to Streleska Bay. But no such protection was available for the division and the two brigades more immediately threatened in the vicinity of Inkerman. Though both Commanders of the Allied armies felt anxiety on account of this exposed flank, nothing was done to make it secure. General Canrobert paid us the compliment of placing extraordinary reliance on our troops,—especially the _bonnets de poil_, as he called the Guards; on the other hand, Lord Raglan, weak in numbers, thought he could not spare any of his men from the trenches. Still, the omission to safeguard this vital position with earthworks has never been explained, for as Turks could have been obtained for this purpose, and as Engineer Officers were available, the excuse given, like many others put forward to cover our deficiencies in this extraordinary war, can hardly be deemed satisfactory. Of the value of works of defence to be occupied in case of attack, it is sufficient to point out that, if we were victorious without them, we should have been far stronger with them, and the battle (if it had taken place at all under these circumstances) could not have failed to result in greater disaster to the enemy, and in much less loss to ourselves. The Guards furnished piquets to watch the flank and rear of the British army. On the 1st of November a stronger force was considered necessary to accomplish this object, and the Brigade supplied eight piquets daily. Six (numbered 1 to 6) mounted an hour before daybreak for twenty-four hours, under the Field-Officer of the day while the other two (Nos. 7 and 8) were posted as a reserve from sunset until an hour after sunrise, the whole during the night being placed under the command of a “full Colonel of the Brigade.”[267] Besides finding three working parties in the trenches, each 40 to 50 men strong under an Officer, the Coldstream furnished, on the 4th, piquets Nos. 5 and 8, and again on the 5th, Nos. 3, 5, and 6. Thus before dawn on the morning of the battle, the Battalion had two piquets (Nos. 4 and 5 companies) coming off, and three (Nos. 6 and 7 companies) going on duty; so that four companies were absorbed, and when the first alarm was given, only half the Battalion (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 8 companies) were in camp. The Colonel on duty, during the night 4th-5th, should have been Lord F. Paulet, but as he was incapacitated by illness, Colonel Upton took his place; moreover, Lieut.-Colonel Newton, detailed Field Officer of the day for the 5th, had left long before daylight began to appear. The next senior Officer was Lieut.-Colonel Dawson, and, when the first alarm was given, he quickly formed up what remained of the Battalion, and immediately marched them to the front where the battle was heard, to the support of the Second Division, who were then seriously engaged with the enemy. ----- Footnote 267: _Brigade Order_ , Nov. 1, 1854. -----