“Great Britain,” says the report of the Commissioners sent to the Crimea, “has often had reasons to be proud of her army, but it is doubtful whether, the whole range of military history furnishes an example of an army exhibiting, throughout a long campaign, qualities as high as have distinguished the forces under Lord Raglan’s command. The strength of the men gave way under excessive labour, watching, exposure, and privation; but they never murmured, their spirit never failed, and the enemy, though far outnumbering them, never detected in those whom he encountered any signs of weakness. Their numbers were reduced by disease and by casualties to a handful of men, compared with the great extent of the lines which they constructed and defended, yet the army never abated its confidence in itself, and never descended from its acknowledged military pre-eminence. Both men and Officers, when so reduced that they were hardly fit for the lighter duties of the camp, scorned to be excused the severe and perilous work of the trenches, lest they should throw an undue amount of duty upon their comrades; yet they maintained every foot of ground against all the efforts of the enemy, and with numbers so small that, perhaps, no other troops would even have made the attempt. Suffering and privation have frequently led to crime in armies as in other communities, but offences of a serious character have been unknown in the British army in the Crimea ... intemperance has been rare. Every one who knows anything of the constitution of an army must feel that, when troops so conduct themselves throughout a long campaign, the Officers must have done their duty and set the example.”[309] ----- Footnote 309: First Report, 1855, pp. 2 and 3. ----- The Russians, on the other hand, except for the great labour and care expended on the fortress, remained almost quiescent during the winter months. Restricting their energies to the defences of Sevastopol and to the annoyance of the besiegers, they made the fortress exceedingly strong, and pushed advanced works in front of the line they had already occupied. The greater portion of their field army was brought into the town to reinforce the garrison, the remainder being quartered in the neighbouring villages, or in the Tchernaya Valley. But no offensive operations were undertaken, notwithstanding their immensely superior numbers; and this was the more fortunate, since in the midwinter our forces were so weakened that the English trenches were guarded by only 350 men. This extraordinary inactivity on the part of the enemy has excited astonishment, and it may well be asked—