A History of the Four Georges, Volume IMcCarthy, Justin
History
A History of the Four Georges, Volume I
McCarthy, Justin
Great Britain -- History -- 1714-1837; Great Britain -- Politics and government -- 1714-1837
"The world is right about Lord Stair," said the King; "I
never before saw a man who would not have troubled me with excuses and
ceremony."
[Sidenote: 1723--Spain]
The French Government naturally feared that the recall of Lord Stair
might be marked by a change in the friendly disposition of England.
This fear became greater on the death of Stanhope. The English
Government, however, took steps to reassure the Regent of France.
Townshend himself wrote at once to Cardinal Dubois, promising to
maintain as before a cordial friendship with the French Government.
Walpole was entirely imbued with the instincts of such a policy. The
chief disturbing influence in Continental politics arose from the
anxiety of Spain to recover Gibraltar and Minorca, and, in fact, to get
back again all that had been taken from her by the Treaty of Utrecht.
The territorial and other arrangements which concluded with the Treaty
of Utrecht made themselves the central point of all the foreign policy
of that time: these States were concerned to maintain the treaty; those
were eager to break through its bonds. It holds in the politics of
that day the place which was held by the Treaty of Vienna at a later
period. There is always much of the hypocritical about the manner in
which treaties of that highly artificial nature are made. No State
really intends to hold by them any longer than she finds that they
serve her own interests. If they are imposed upon a State and are
injurious to her, that State never means to submit to them any longer
than she is actually under compulsion. New means and impulses to break
away from such bonds are given to those inclined that way, in the fact
that the arrangements are usually made without the slightest concern
for the populations of the countries concerned, but only for dynastic
or other political considerations. The pride of the Spanish people was
so much hurt by some of the conditions of the Treaty {228} of Utrecht
that a Spanish sovereign or minister would always be popular who could
point to his people a way to escape from its bonds or to rend them in
pieces. Spain, therefore, was always looking out for new alliances.
She saw at one time a fresh chance for trying her policy, and she held
out every inducement in her power to the Emperor Charles the Sixth and
to Russia to enter into a combination against France and England. The
Emperor was without a son, and, in consequence, had issued his famous
Pragmatic Sanction, providing that his hereditary dominions in Austria,
Hungary, and Bohemia should descend to his daughter Maria Theresa. The
great Powers of Europe had not as yet seen fit to guarantee, or even
recognize, this succession. Spain held out the temptation to the
Emperor of her own guarantee to the Pragmatic Sanction and of several
important concessions in the matter of trade and commerce to Austria,
on consideration that the Emperor should assist Spain to recover her
lost territory.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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