have led to an order, in 1528, limiting these references to cases of great importance, but this restriction was removed in another of July 11, 1532, when it was explained that, if an inquisitor dissented from the other two and from the Ordinary, the case must be sent up.[458] Practically, the authority of the Suprema over the tribunals was limited only by its discretion, and inevitably it was making constant encroachments on their independence of action. Its correspondence, in 1539 and 1540, with the Valencia tribunal shows an increasing number of cases submitted to it and its supervision over minute details of current business.[459] In 1543 the case of a Morisca, named Mari Gomez la Sazeda, shows that a sentence of torture had to be submitted to it and its reply indicates conscientious scrutiny of the records, for it ordered the re-examination of certain witnesses, but, if they were absent or dead, then she might be tortured moderately.[460] A further extension of authority is seen during a witch-craze in Catalonia when, to restrain the cruelty of the Barcelona tribunal, in 1537, all cases of witchcraft, after being voted on, were ordered to be submitted to it for final decision and, in a recrudescence of the epidemic, between 1545 and 1550, it required all sentences of relaxation to be sent to it, even when unanimous.[461] On this last occasion, however, the Barcelona tribunal asserted its independence of action by disregarding the command and a phrase in the Instructions of 1561, requiring, in all cases of special importance, the sentences to be submitted before execution, was too vague to be of much practical effect.[462] [Sidenote: _CONTROL OVER TRIBUNALS_]